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THE POVERTY OF SOCRATIC QUESTIONING:
ASKING AND ANSWERING IN THE MEND
Thomas D. Eisele*
I understand [philosophy 1 as a willingness to think not about something other than what ordinary human beings think about, but rather
to learn to think undistractedly about things that ordinary human
beings cannot help thinking about, or anyway cannot help having
occur to them, sometimes in fantasy, sometimes asa flash across a
landscape; such things, for example, as whether we can know the
world as it is in itself, or whether others really know the nature of
one's own experiences, or whether good and bad are relative, or
whether we might not now be dreaming that we are awake, or
whether modern tyrannies and weapons and spaces and speeds and
art are continuous with the past of the human race or discontinuous,
and hence whether the learning of the human race is not irrelevant to
the problems it has brought before itself. Such thoughts are instances
of that characteristic human willingness to allow questions for itself
which it cannot answer with satisfaction. Cynics about philosophy,
and perhaps about humanity, will find that questions without answers are empty; dogmatists will claim to have arrived at answers;
philosophers after my heart will rather wish to convey the thought
that while there may be no satisfying answers to such questions in
certain forms, there are, so to speak, directions to answers, ways to
think, that are worth the time of your life to discover. (It is a further
question for me whether directions of this kind are teachable, in ways
suited to what we think of as schools.)1

For those of us who still claim that we teach Socratlcally, or who
think of our teaching as being inspired by Socrates' example, it re-

* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. J.D., 1973, Harvard University. Ph.D.
(Philosophy), 1984, University of Michigan.
This Essay examines Socratic teaching by investigating Socrates' practice in the Meno. Its
companion essay, Bitter Knowledge: Socrates and Teaching by Disillusionment, examines Socratic teaching by investigating my own practice in law school today. They are meant to complement and to complicate one another, as they also are meant to extend and to supplement some
of the views of Socratic teaching expressed in two earlier essays of mine: Thomas D. Eisele,
Must Virtue Be Taught?, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495 (1987) [hereinafter Eisele, Virtue]; and
Thomas D. Eisele, "Never Mind the Manner of My Speech": The Dilemma of Socrates' Defense in the Apology, 14 LEGAL STUD. F. 253 (1990) [hereinafter Eisele, Speech].
Professors L.R. LaRue, Thomas Shaffer, and James Boyd White have offered me several
generous criticisms in the best Socratic spirit of the inquiry. I dedicate this Essay to Jim White.
The inspiration and example of his work have proven to be, for me, indispensable.
1. STANLEY CAVELL, The Thought of Movies, in THEMES OUT OF SCHOOL: EFFECTS
AND CAUSES 3, 9 (1984).
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mains a challenge to account for whatever affinity there may be between our teaching and that of Socrates. The affinity (if any) can be
elusive. Yet, trying to understand what I am doing when I teach as I
do in law school continues to matter to me, and an important part of
this continued interest concerns the relation that my teaching may have
with that of Socrates. In this, I suppose that I am not much different
from other men and women who find themselves spending much of
their time in the classroom asking questions-questions that may seem
as much asked of oneself as they are of one's students. It can be an odd
way to spend an hour.
The strangeness of the situation is two-fold. First, the method or
technique of Socratic questioning seems to be simplicity itself. What
we do is simply to ask questions of others: questions about cases and
statutes and rules and about the reasons for those rules or for the
court's decision or for the legislature's enactment; questions about facts
and what happened to the parties involved and about others who might
have become involved or whose assistance in resolving the dispute
might have been sought; questions about procedure and what was done
to bring this dispute to the position in which we find it and about ways
that might have been found to resolve or at least to prosecute it differently; and so on. How can that be revolutionary? How can that be a
radical way to teach?
However we may attempt to answer such questions, we know-we
can see-that this method of questioning is revolutionary, is radical.
For one thing, it has radical or revolutionary results. We can see the
results in our students (some of them, surely); that is, we can see the
results in the way that our students learn to question the cases and
statutes and rules for themselves; learn how to take the cases and statutes and rules apart analytically and to put them back together again;
learn how to apply the rules and cases and how to distinguish them;
and learn all the other techniques that we teach our students for working in the law. And then, too, there are some techniques of lawyering
that our students learn without their being taught; they discover these
techniques by themselves in their engagement with the materials and
the medium of the law. Yet all of this is an anticipated benefit of
teaching inspired by Socrates. We know that our students learn more
than we can teach them; Socratic questioning is intended exactly to
provoke them to further study and self-discovery.
For other students, the impact and rewards of Socratic teaching are
less immediate. Still, there always are some students who, without
seeming to have acquired the knack of what we were trying to teach
them during law school, report back to us or to some colleague of ours,
years later, that this or that question, uttered once a long time ago,
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almost forgotten, at some point awoke that student from his or her
slumbers. I think that almost every teacher during his or her career
must have heard at least one such testimonial to the daunting, energizing, cumulative impact of our questioning. But, then, how can such a
simple process of questioning have this seemingly disproportionate
effect?
I said that the strangeness of our situation is two-fold, and the second oddity is that, when looking specifically at the effect that Socratic
questioning has on students, one finds, I think, a strong element of
disillusionment. How is it that we law teachers earn our living by disillusioning our students? What good is that?
In a companion Essay,2 I have described certain aspects of my law
school teaching, saying that, in part, my teaching aims at disillusioning
my students and, yet, that this is not all that my teaching aims
at-there is something else again that I also try to teach. Both aspects
of my teaching (the initial disillusionment, and the something else
again) are intimate points of relation with Socrates' way of teaching. It
is quite possible that I am wrong about this, of course, or that, in this
respect, my teaching is not representative of what other law teachers
do. But I do not think so; rather, I think the kinship is there, for me
and for others. So, to the extent that we teachers of law truly intend to
inherit the legacy of Socrates, I believe that we are asked to accept as a
part of our legacy intentionally teaching so as to disillusion our students, and yet we are intending to supply them with something else as
well. How can this be? What might it mean?
In the following pages, I pursue these questions, not from the vantage point of the way in which I teach in law school, but rather from
the perspective of the way in which Socrates taught in the dialogues
that we have inherited from Plato. For, in order to claim an affinity
between what we do in law school and what Socrates did, we need a
detailed description of both terms in this pairing. In this Essay, I supply an account of the Socratic side of the coin.
I.

THE Meno's Progress and Meno's Progress

The Meno 3 proposes itself for study in this regard because it occu-

2. Thomas D. Eisele, Bitter Know/edge: Socrates and Teaching by DisiIIusionment, 45
MERCER L. REV. 587 (1994).
3. Throughout this Essay, I use the Jowett translation, which seems to be the standard
translation of the Meno and the most readily available. It can be found as follows: PLATO,
MENo (Benjamin Jowett trans., 3d ed. Library of Liberal Arts 1949) (including introduction by
Fulton H. Anderson) [hereinafter Jowett & Anderson]; 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 349
(Benjamin Jowett trans., 3d ed. Random House 1937) (including introduction by Raphael De-
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pies a central place in Plato's dialogues. So far as scholars have been
able to date and organize the dialogues,· the Meno comes after the
period of the early dialogues (including the Protagoras and the Gorgias), and it begins the period of the middle dialogues (preceding, perhaps immediately, the Republic). The Meno also is central in the
sense that it articulates the major Platonic themes that we have come
to expect. First and foremost, it deals with education (as do most of the
early and middle dialogues): how we are to educate the young and, in
particular, whether it is possible to teach them virtue. But beyond the
core question of our ability to teach or to train a young person in
virtue, the Meno also considers the nature of knowledge and whether
it is a kind of recollection; it introduces a conception of the "forms" (to
be elaborated in later dialogues); it draws distinctions between sense
and reason, true opinion and knowledge; and it incompletely pursues
notions of justice and of what we understand justice to be. The Meno
manages to do all of this in dialogue form-not the traditional prose of
analytic treatise writing-within the compass of thirty to forty pages.
It is not surprising, then, that F.H. Anderson, in the Library of Liberal Arts edition of this dialogue, begins his Introduction with this
praise: "The Meno is described by Walter Pater as the 'most characteristic dialogue of Plato.' John Stuart Mill calls it a 'gem' among Platonic works, and most aptly, for in no other dialogue of Plato are there
exhibited within comparable compass so many facets as the Meno
contains. "6
My interest in the Meno has less to do with the dialogue's illustration of Platonic themes, however, than with its depiction of Socrates'

mos). All quotations in this Essay from the Meno, as well as all citations to the Meno, are from
and to the Library of Liberal Arts edition. To enable readers to find the relevant passage in
other translations, however, I have provided parallel parenthetical citations to the standard
Stephanus pagination.
I also have used three other translations of the Meno, all more modern than Jowett's
translation, in clarifying some of the points that I found problematic. All three modern translations have proven helpful: 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 131 (Reginald E. Allen trans., Yale
u.P. 1984) [hereinafter Allen]; PLATO'S MENO (Malcolm Brown ed. & W.K.C. Guthrie trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill 1971) [hereinafter Brown & Guthrie]; PLATO'S MENO (G.M.A. Grube trans.,
2d ed. Hackett 1980) [hereinafter Grube].
4. See Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 7; Grube, supra note 3, at 1; Brown & Guthrie, supra note 3, at xii. Professor Allen has the best discussion that I have read of the problems
involved in trying to date and organize the Platonic dialogues. See Allen, supra note 3, at 6-16;
see also GREGORY VLASTOS, SOCRATES. IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER 45-53 (1991).
5. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 7. Perhaps it is worth mentioning, in this context,
that Kierkegaard equally felt the power of the Meno. In his tract on instruction, Philosophical
Fragments, Kierkegaard's initial question ("How far does the Truth admit of being learned?")
is related directly to the paradox of inquiry, see infra text accompanying notes 69, 92, put by
Meno to Socrates. See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS OR A FRAGMENT
OF PHILOSOPHY 11 (David Swenso!l & Howard Hong trans., 2d ed. 1962).
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teaching. It contains a vivid portrait of Socrates in action, as a teacher
and a learner, a searcher and an inquirer. The dialogue opens with a
discussion between Socrates and Meno; then it shifts to a much shorter
exchange between Socrates and Meno's slave-boy; and this exchange is
itself briefly interrupted by a short discussion between Socrates and
Meno again. When Socrates finishes with the slave-boy, another brief
discussion occurs between Socrates and Meno, which also is interrupted by the appearance of Anytus, an Athenian, with whom Socrates
takes the time to converse. The dialogue then concludes with yet another discussion between Socrates and Meno.
The movement of the Meno can be outlined this way:
1. Socrates and Meno (pp. 23-38 (70a-82b»
2. Socrates and the Slave-Boy (pp. 38-41, 42-43 (82b-84a, 84d-85b»
(with an interlude for Socrates and Meno, pp. 41-42 (84a-d»
3. Socrates and Meno (pp. 43-49 (85b-8ge»
4. Socrates and Anytus (pp. 49-55 (90a-95a»
5. Socrates and Meno (pp. 55-61 (95a-100b»
This synoptic outline reveals that Meno is the chief character of this
drama; he (or something about him that we are supposed to notice) is
the subject of this dialogue. We see Meno at three different stages:
first, when he meets Socrates and asks him a question; second, after
Socrates has discussed some geometric figures with Meno's slave-boy;
and, third, after Socrates has discussed virtue and knowledge with
Anytus, a passing Athenian. So, I take the Meno's progress to be
Meno's progress, his growth or education.
But a second theme, something else besides a simple charting of
Meno's growth, is going on simultaneously. During the course of this
dialogue, Socrates converses with three people. These three people illustrate three different types of students, three different ways that people have of learning and gaining knowledge. Socrates mainly asks them
questions, and his questions elicit different responses and results. As
the Meno progresses, then, we see Socrates teaching three different
students by talking with them and questioning them, and we also see
how they are affected or unaffected by this discussion and these
questions.
Let me begin with this second theme: the three different types of
students. They are different types of students in the sense that they are
differently prepared and differently motivated in their discussions with
Socrates. In this respect, these three people are differently situated both
in terms of their ability or willingness to learn and in terms of how
they relate to Socrates as their teacher.
Meno begins the dialogue by putting a question to Socrates, a ques-
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tion about how virtue is acquired, a question that Socrates for some
reason does not like. s Not answering it directly, Socrates puts Meno's
question aside and. instead asks Meno a question about the nature of
virtue, which Meno finds painfully easy: "There will be no difficulty,
Socrates, in answering your question.'" For the next few pages of dialogue, Meno then tries unsuccessfully to answer Socrates' "easy"
question. 8
Meno's slave-boy, by contrast, initiates nothing; he puts no initial
question to Socrates. Rather, Meno picks the slave-boy out of a crowd
of surrounding servants, and Socrates asks him questions. 9 But, once
engaged by Socrates, the slave-boy, who is initially quite timid, eventually makes a claim to know something. It turns out, however, that the
slave-boy's claim to know is wrong; it is based upon a false inference. Io
Socrates then corrects this false inference, leaving the slave-boy somewhat abashed. But Socrates, taking the slave-boy in tow, once again
leads him through a maze of questions to the correct inference and
allows him to draw it for himself.ll Emboldened, the slave-boy then is
asked a further series of questions, which elicit the fact that he still
does not understand. He may have made the correct inference when
coa"ched by Socrates, but his correct guess was not based on knowledge
or understanding. Socrates' questions get the slave-boy to see, then,
that he still does not know what he thought he knew: "Indeed, Socrates, I do not know."12
Anytus comes along later and joins Socrates and Meno while they
are engaged, once again, in their common pursuit of the question of
the nature and teachability of virtue. IS Anytus is an important Athenian politician (who later plays a role in the trial of Socrates) and is
conveniently pressed into service, as the slave-boy was. But Anytus illustrates a different cast of mind, a different educational attitude, because he is not susceptible to Socrates' searching questions.
Socrates begins by simply asking Anytus, as a friendly bystander, for
help: "Who are the teachers of virtue ?"14 One might expect Anytus to
be disposed to respond warmly to Socrates' invitation, because Anytus
shares Socrates' low opinion of the Sophists as purported teachers of

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 23-24 (70a-7Ib).
[d. at 24 (7Ie).
See id. at 24-29 (7Ic-75b).
See id. at 38 (82b).
See id. at 39 (82e).
See id. at 40 (83b-c).
[d. at 41 (84a).
See id. at 49 (8ge-90a).
[d. at 49 (90b).

HeinOnline -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 226 1994-1995

1994]

POVER TY OF SOCRA TIC QUESTIONING

227

virtue, and Socrates· casts his question in the form of a request-whether Anytus can help Meno find someone who can teach
him (Meno) virtue. III Instead of helping Meno, however, Anytus responds by castigating the Sophists; he vents his. spleen:
Anytus: By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or
kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will
ever be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them [the
Sophists]; for they are a manifest pest and corrupting influence to
those who have to do with them. 18

It turns out that this invective is not worth much as advice for Meno
because, when Anytus is pressed on the matter, we discover that Anytus' criticism of the Sophists is as unfounded in knowledge as the slaveboy's original inference was. Anytus admits that he really is not wellacquainted with the Sophists. 17 This admission puzzles Socrates, as
does the cavalier attitude toward knowledge and criticism that· it
reveals, and he says as much. IS How can Anytus claim to know that
the Sophists are corrupt teachers of virtue when Anytus is not acquainted with the Sophists? But, unlike the slave-boy, Anytus does not
see (or acknowledge) his own ignorance in this matter. "I am sure that
I know what manner of men these are, whether I am acquainted with
them or not."19
Then, to cap it off, Anytus shuns Socrates' suggestion that perhaps
some noted Athenians themselves do not know what virtue is, or, at
least, that they have been unable to teach their children virtue. Anytus
is offended by this Socratic suggestion; he finds it slanderous, and he
refuses to entertain or to consider it by way of helping Socrates to
investigate it. 20
I said that these three students differ in their cast of mind, their
attitude toward learning or education. Part of their difference is their
motivation: Meno wants to know, he wants to learn. The dialogue begins with his questioning Socrates. In a sense, one can say that Meno's
question about virtue is the motivating question of the Meno. The fact
that he does not know what to do with his own question, that he does
not know how to pursue it on his own, is less important than the fact
that the question is his own, that he came up with it by listening to
himself, by harkening to some doubt or quibble in himself. Is this not

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id. at 50 (91a-b).
Id. at 50-51 (9.1 c).
See id. at 51-52 (92b-c).
See id. at 52 (92b-c).
Id. (92c).
See id. at 53-54 (93c-95a).
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what we hope to teach our students to do by way of Socratic questioning-how to pursue their own questions, how to make the most of
them?
If we agree that Meno's question is the motivating question of the
dialogue, then we must immediately acknowledge the other side of that
fact, namely, that Meno does not know what to do with his own question. And this ignorance is a part of what Socrates brings out in the
first few pages of the dialogue. He shows Meno not only that he
(Meno) does not have an acceptable or adequate answer to his own
question (that is not so bad in itself; the same is true of many of us
many times), but, more importantly, that Meno does not realize this
about himself. When Meno puts his question to Socrates, he is unaware of this failing in himself, in his knowledge. This may be one
reason why Socrates refuses the question about virtue as it is originally
put to him by Meno. He does not refuse the topic of virtue-its nature
or its teachability-il'\deed, Socrates is obsessed with such matters. But
he does refuse the form and tone of Meno's question, the attitude in
which it is asked.
Socrates' refusal to answer Meno's question as asked is as positive
as it is negative, because it leads to a concerted investigation into the
nature and teachability of virtue. It does so; however, only in so far as
Meno is willing to take up these matters in a form and with an attitude that Socrates finds proper. This may strike some people as being
hopelessly paternalistic of Socrates, but I take it to be an essential element of anything that we might call "teaching." Teaching requires
that a student be able to participate with the teacher, be able to see or
take or accept what the teacher says as significant, valuable, or worthwhile. Teaching also requires, a willingness and an ability on the part
of the teacher to say, "This is proper; that is not." And the teacher
must also be able to show its propriety, to demonstrate it, in his or her
actions, in his or her teaching, to the satisfaction of the student. The
student must see how this test of the experiment, how this development
of the equation or proof, how this interpretation of doctrine or rule or
statute, how this reading of the case or text or poem, makes sense in
the context of the materials with which they-teacher and student-are working. The teacher must be able to make sense out of
these materials-legal sense, literary sense, or philosophical
sense-and the student must be able to follow this educative activity.
And then the student must go on to make his or her own constructions,
constructions that themselves make acceptable sense out of the very
same materials.
This conveyance of a sense of propriety-in the questions one asks,
in the ways in which one pursues them, in the answers that one finds
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acceptable or satisfying-is inherent in teaching. Meno's education in
this dialogue consists in the fact that he learns to seek as Socrate~
seeks, learns to inquire as Socrates inquires. And yet, Socrates ultimately leaves Meno on his own, to inquire for himself and on his own
behalf (and on behalf of others) into these matters that are puzzling
him.
So, while Socrates refuses Meno's opening question as it is initially
presented to him, Socrates also shows Meno a way to put Meno's own
question fruitfully-a way to translate it, or to understand it, that can
be fruitfully followed out and investigated (if not exac~ly to an answer,
then at least to a conclusion). And through it all, despite several setbacks and even reprimands from Socrates, Meno never totally gives up,
never leaves the discussion or inquiry. Certainly, he is daunted by
some of Socrates' methods and his tough questions. Often Meno does
not know what to say or do in response to Socrates' questions or to one
of the many impasses they reach in their inquiry into virtue. (But then,
neither does Socrates always know what to say or do.) The point remains that Menonever calls it quits; he perseveres. .
Anytus, on the other hand, does not want to know. He not only does
not want to know about virtue, but he essentially refuses to listen to
whatever Socrates has to say. Eventually he leaves in a huff over what
he imagines to have been Socrates' defamation of some of the rich,
important, and famous men and families of Athens. 21 (It seems patent
that Plato is relying upon his audience's presumed knowledge of Anytus' later participation in the trial against Socrates, where Anytus
presented to the jury the charges leveled by the politicians against Socrates. 22 ) Anytus never shows himself to be open to Socrates' questions;
the concerns that Socrates has about the possible teachability of virtue
and its essence or nature leave Anytus cold-or closed. He has nothing
to do with them.
Furthermore, Anytus has no questions of his own. He hates the
Sophists with a passion, perhaps a passion as great as Socrates' disdain
for them. But Anytus' passion is based on nothing: no knowledge, no
experience, no acquaintance with the Sophists. Anytus knows what he
thinks, but not why he thinks as he does; and he seems not to be quizzical about the whys and wherefores of his opinions. With such a student, nothing works; a teacher can do nothing with him. (But perhaps

21. See id. at 55 (95a).
22. For further details on Anytus' participation in Socrates' trial for impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens, see PLATO, The Apology, in EUTHYPHRO. ApOLOGY, CRITO 21,
22 n.l, 23 n.2, 28, 34, 35, 39 n.8, 41 (F.J. Church & Robert D. Cumming trans., 2d rev. ed.,
Library of Liberal Arts 1956).
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it is the teacher.23 Then the question becomes whether another teacher
can reach this student, can do a better job of inspiring or provoking the
student. While this possibility is a faint one, it may help to account for
the fact that, at the very end of the dialogue, Socrates implores Meno,
now that he has been taught the Socratic method, to seek out Anytus
and to show him the way, to try to awaken him to these same questions and concerns.24 Perhaps Meno can do what Socrates was unable
to do. I doubt it.)
The slave-boy, in the middle of the dialogue, also splits the difference between the two opposites of Meno and Anytus. Meno's slave-boy
is neither like Meno in initiating any inquiry with Socrates, in wanting to know, nor is he akin to Anytus in not wanting to know. Rather,
the slave-boy is like Anytus in his initial passiveness, his self-satisfaction with his state of knowledge-even if it turns out to be a state of
ignorance-and yet, he also is like Meno in that, once provoked by
Socrates' questions, the slave-boy is willing to learn. Thus, the slaveboy starts in a passive mode and then changes into an active learner,
an active seeker. If Meno can be said to want to know, and Anytus not
to want to know, then the slave-boy can be said to be open to knowledge, to its possibility or possible acquisition, although he does not
know how to begin. He is there, he is passive, he is comfortable in his
supposed knowledge, or even in his ignorance-but he can be
provoked.
If we say, then, that the slave-boy can be provoked, that Meno can
be taught (even though he thinks he already knows the answers to the
questions that Socrates initially asks him), and that Anytus cannot be
taught (because he is not interested in learning, in being taught, and
thus cannot be provoked into inquiry by Socrates' questions), this suggests another important difference among these three types of students:
their relative receptivity to Socratic questioning.
Even though Meno thinks that he knows, he is able to recognize

23. This is the converse of the point made earlier regarding the requirement that the student be able to take what the teacher says as significant, important, or worthwhile. See supra p.
228. Here we are looking at the teacher, who needs to be able to take the student's response as
significant. Otherwise, as Stanley Cavell puts it, the student will not learn (at least, not from
this teacher):
If my teacher of French will not accept what I say and do as what he says and
does, perhaps treating my American accent with tacit contempt, then I will not
learn French (from him). But what happens if "my elders", all of them (those
bigger people from whom ... I learn to use words), will not accept what I say
and do as what they say and do? Must they? Is it only natural for them to? Is it
their responsibility?
STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 28 (1979).
24. See Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 61 (100b-c).
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from his stumbling, bumbling responses to Socrates' questions that he
does not know, or at least that he needs help, needs teaching. Meno is
receptive to Socrates' questions, although it takes him a while to get
their drift. (This is shown in a crucial sequence of exchanges in the
dialogue, to which we shall return. 2&)
The slave-boy, on the other hand, does not necessarily think in the
beginning that he knows at all; he is quite shy and hesitant in Socrates'
presen~e. But Socrates manages to draw him out, and gradually the
slave-boy gains enough confidence in his ability to answer Socrates'
question that he then ventures an opinion, one that he claims is based
on knowledge-which claim is then shown to be wrong. Dashed, the
slave-boy retreats into silence. But he still is willing and able to be
reached again by Socrates, who by careful questioning again draws the
slave-boy out of his shell and leads him to the correct inference, to the
r:ight answer: Socrates leads him to knowledge.
Whatever knowledge is gained by Meno and the slave-boy is due
not only to Socrates' estimable art of asking the right questions, but
also to Meno's and the slave-boy's receptivity to Socrates' questions.
These two students are praiseworthy in their resourceful receptivity,
their willingness to entertain questions. Meno is, of course, the central
study here, and his perseverance in the face of Socrates' sustained criticism deserves credit. But the slave-boy also merits praise. He may not
be a self-starter, the way that Meno seems to be, and the slave-boy
may be a bit timid, but he is, nonetheless, brave in facing Socrates'
relentless questioning and in continuing to volunteer answers, to offer
responses, even when they are offered with trepidation.
Compared to either Meno or the slave-boy, Anytus is unreceptive to
Socrates' questions. It is not that he rejects them out of hand, or that
he refuses to listen, because initially Anytus participates with Socrates.
But even Anytus' initial responses seem perfunctory;28 and, after Socrates scorns Anytus' criticism of the Sophists (as being unfounded in
knowledge) and begins to question Anytus as to the ability of important Athenians to teach their children to be virtuous, Anytus' responses
become churlish. Anytus finds such questions scandalous, an affront to
the good families of Athens, and eventually refuses to hear them. 27 He
is not receptive to Socratic questions, or to inquiry, or .to learning.

25. See infra pp. 239-42.
26. See Jowett &. Anderson, supra note 3, at 49-50 (90c-91 b).
27. See id. at 52-54 (92c-95a).
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WHEN Two Go TOGETHER: THE NATURE OF SOCRATIC

INQUIRY

I began the previous "Section by saying that Meno is the central
character in this dialogue and that throughout it we are meant to see
something about him (call it his "education").28 But, since then, I have
been surveying three types of students as embodied by Meno, the
slave-boy, and Anytus. Perhaps I can now say the following with some
warrant: Meno wants to learn, but is initially unaware of his ignorance; the slave-boy does not begin by wanting to learn, but it turns
out that he is willing to listen to Socrates' questions and to give them a
try; and Anytus neither wants to learn nor is he willing to listen or to
be provoked into inquiry by Socrates' questions. This would be one
expansion of my earlier remark that these three people are differently
situated in terms of their ability or willingness to learn and in terms of
how they relate to Socrates as their teacher. 29
As their teacher, Socrates is trying to show these students (with varying degrees of success) how to inquire into matters that they may
find puzzling or that they may be provoked to begin questioning and,
for this purpose, is trying to teach them the method of inquiry that he
has developed. We can read the Men 0, then, not simply as an illustration of Meno's growth and education-although surely it is that-but
also as a dialogue that illustrates the Socratic method in action. And, of
course, since the Socratic method is a means of education, these are
really two sides of the same phenomenon: Socrates uses his method as
a way of educating Meno, and his education of Meno exemplifies the
Socratic method.
Perhaps the first thing to note about the Socratic method of inquiry
is that it requires two or more people talking with one another, sharing their views and thoughts, their words and ideas, trying to express
things to their own satisfaction and to the satisfaction of the other person involved. During this intense conversational process, each of the
participants is urged to be candid, to say what he or she really thinks,
feels, or believes. (As Socrates remarks once to the slave-boy, "Very
good; I like to hear you say what you think."30) Each participant also
is asked to be brutally honest in assessing himself or herself and his or
her conversational partner, either when a flaw is found or when conviction is reached. To discover that either of the partners in inquiry is
talking nonsense, or does not mean what he or she says, or does not

28. See supra p. 225.
29. See id.
30. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 40 (83d).
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know what he or she is saying, is to be refuted (what Socrates calls
"elenchus"31). So, Socratic inquiry is shared inquiry. It does not work
alone and is not meant to work alone. 32 Why?

31. I am talking here in general terms about the "Socratic method" and "Socratic inquiry," and I might appropriately be asked to specify what exactly these terms mean. For
example, Professor L.H. LaRue has put to me the distinction that e1enchus is not so much a
method of inquiry as it is a method of testing, testing the truth and consistency of one's beliefs
and claims. On this understanding of Socratic method, the initial inquiry is bent on evoking
assertions or claims, which then are tested by the elenchic method of argument and refutation. If
the assertions pass this test and do not stand refuted or are not found to be inconsistent, then
they are likely to be true.
But there is a sense, of course, in which the activity of elenchic argument and refutation
can be said to be "inquiry," because to test the truth or falsity of an assertion or claim is to
inquire into its truth or falsity. In addition, and perhaps more to the point, I find myself wanting to say that.the process or activity of elenchic argument and testing is one way to inquire into
the knowledge that a person has. If we try to refute ourselves or the assertio~ or claim of
another person and end up doing so, then we discover something about ourselves or about that
other person-namely, that we (or he or she) did not know. This is an addition to our knowledge (either of ourselves or of another). On the other hand, if we try to refute o!lrselves (or
another) and end up not being able to do so, then we discover that probably we do (or the other
does) know what we claim (or he or she claimed) to know. So, again, this is an addition to our
knowledge (either of ourselves or of another). So, in this respect, have we not used the elenchic
method to inquire into the state of knowledge of a person? See infra note 78.
On the nature of elenchus in Socrates' dialectical method, James Boyd White says the
following:
The one who claims to know knows nothing after an. This is the elenchus, or
refutation, of which Socrates repeatedly speaks, and it is the heart of dialectic. It
results in a mortification or humiliation of a special kind, for one is mortified by
the invocation not of new facts or ideas but of what one already knows or claims
to know. One part of the self is appealed to against another part, and in the
process a previously unknown self-contradiction is revealed.
.
[A) dialectical refutation (elenchos) requires that one make the other agree with
what one says .... What matters between us is not the other witnesses who can
be brought forward to support your view or mine but whether you can make me
your witness or I can make you mine. For dialectic to exert its fu\1 force upon the
individual mind, complete frankness is essential, a kind of shamelessness in saying
what one rea\1y thinks.
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 95, 102 (1984).
For a further discussion about elenchus, see Eisele, Speech, supra note *, at 274-75.
32. Socrates emphasizes this aspect of his inquiry several times throughout the dialogue.
For example, he discreetly but firmly draws Meno's attention to the fact that their investigation
is a shared effort when he says, "I have no objection to join with you in the inquiry." Jowett &
Anderson, supra note 3, at 36 (80d). Or, again, Socrates gently reminds Meno of what they ar.e
about when he asks, "[S)ha\1 you and I make an effort to inquire together into the nature of
virtue?" Id. at 45 (86c).
,
The same is true of Socrates' effort in talking with Meno's slave-boy. "Mark now the
further development. I shall only ask him, and not teach him, and he shal1 share the inquiry
with me." Id. at 42 (84c-d). Since Socrates' discussion with Meno's slave-boy is itself a shared
inquiry, it would not work, it would not be worth doing (because it would not illustrate what
Socrates wants to show Meno and because it would not be educative for the slave-boy), were it
not truly shared by both of them.
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I believe that Socrates works together with others because he realizes
that, in philosophy, we are working with our ordinary thoughts about
ordinary things (as Stanley Cavell reminds us in the motto to this Essay3S). Or, as G.M. Young was fond of saying, following Maitland,
our work in the humanities-such as history, law, and philosophy-deals with our "common thoughts of common things."34 And
other people are as much a source of knowledge and information about
these matters as we are; their views, their minds, their conceptions, are
as revelatory as ours are of the theories or constructions that we may
possess on such matters. What we wish to learn about is something
common to all of us, and in this respect it is something that we share
(or that we are capable of sharing). It is a part of our common inheritance as human beings, a shared possession, or at least a shared object,
of knowledge and experience. In the Men 0, the inquiry happens to be
focused upon the nature and the attributes of virtue: what it is, how
human beings gain or lose or exemplify it, how it can be transmitted
between generations, and so forth. But the question pursued by Socrates might just as easily be the nature and extent of our knowledge, or
what piety is and how we act piously or impiously, or what human
courage amounts to, or how we become wise and· what good wisdom is
to us, or what the nature of happiness is, or how power. is a part of
human life and society and the ways in which power can be distinguished from justice or law, or any of a number of other topics of
inquiry. All of these may be said to name philosophical topics, no
doubt, but they are topics of philosophical thought, inquiry, and discussion because they are common concerns of human beings, things
about which we humans periodically and unpredictably come to be
struck, confused, intrigued, or puzzled. The specific topic for philosophical attention, for Socratic inquiry, makes little difference; what
matters is that the chosen topic is of genuine interest or puzzlement to

33. CAVELL, supra note 1, at 9. Another relevant comment from Cavell is the following:
[T]he ordinary world . . . may not be all there is, but it is important enough:
morality is in that world, and so are force and love; so is art and a part of knowledge (the part which is about that world); and so is religion (wherever God is).
Some mathematics and science, no doubt, are not.
STANLEY CAVELL, Must We Mean What We Say?, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 1,
40 (1969).
As to the ordinariness or commonness of Socrates' topics, see Eisele, Speech, supra note .,
at 268.
34. G.M. YOUNG, Maitland, in DAYLIGHT AND CHAMPAIGN 288, 290 (1937) ("Law, as
[Maitland] understood it, is fundamentally a system of common thought about common
things."); FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, The Hide, in DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 357, 520
(1897) ("Above all, by slow degrees the thoughts of our forefathers, their common thoughts
about common things, will have become thinkable once more.").

HeinOnline -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 234 1994-1995

1994]

POVER TY OF SOCRA TIC QUESTIONING

235

us, to those of us engaged in the inquiry. (And since the given topic
intrigues or attracts us, disturbs or distracts us, it is as accurate to say
that the topic picks us as it is to say that we "choose" it.)
In such a context, no one of us is better situated or equipped than
anyone else; what we wish to know is exactly something about our
common inheritance. This is one reason why Socrates denies himself to
no one. all If someone approaches Socrates and asks him a question, this
questioner has Socrates' attention (not necessarily his respect or assent,
but his attention). And this also seems to be why Socrates takes his
interlocutors when, where, and as he finds them. Yes, Socrates wants
to make them better (more acute, more sensitive to the contents and
limits of their lives); yes, he wishes to educate them in the ways of his
Socratic method of inquiry. But, still, Socrates begins with the truly
humble feeling that he can learn from anyone, from everyone. He can.
We can too, if we know how, if we will learn how (from him).
The Socratic way of inquiring philosophically into matters of common knowledge that continue to befuddle and perplex us is to seek to
formulate an adequate definition of the topic in question. We do this,
according to Socrates, by offering definitions of the topic at hand and
then testing these definitions for their adequacy. Regardless of whether
one agrees with Socrates' attempt to find an acceptable definition of the
essence of virtue (and I do not agree with it), it is clear that the main
point of his effort in this dialogue is to goad Meno into offering to the
two of them Meno's own thoughts and words on the nature of virtue.
Timidity in this regard is no virtue. A refusal by Meno to participate
(as Anytus later refuses to help) must end the inquiry. It is Meno's
choice.
.
Initially, it appears that Meno refuses Socrates~ implicit offer to
teach him, because Meno cannot seem to grasp Socrates' way of asking
and answering questions. So, even if Meno wants to learn, it is not at
all clear that he shall be able to learn from Socrates. It seems more
clear, in fact, that Meno cannot learn from Socrates, because Meno's
fumbling attempts to answer Socrates' questions come to nothing. In
contrast, even though the slave-boy does not signal any initial desire to
learn, he still manages to learn from Socrates because he shows himself

35. Some time ago, I said the following about this aspect of Socrates' teaching:
A part of the virtue of Socrates that I see displayed in the Protagoras is his ability
to call upon his capacity for inquiry in aid of anyone-this seems true friendship
indeed. He is a stranger to no one deliberately-unless they estrange themselves
from him or his methods.
Eisele, Virtue, supra note *, at 498. I made some additional comments about Socrates' openness
to discussion with anyone, and about his habit of befriending his interlocutors, in Eisele, Speech,
supra note *, at 264, 267-68.
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capable of joining in the inquiry with Socrates and responding fruitfully to his questions. (In fairness to Meno, however, it might be said
that Socrates' questions put to Meno, about the nature of virtue, are a
good deal more d;fficult than Socrates' questions put to the slave-boy,
about basic arithmetic and certain geometrical figures.) So, as 'suggested in the preceding Section, while "wanting to learn" may be necessary for education to take place, alone it is not sufficient. Wanting to
learn must also be supplemented with "receptivity" -an openness to or
welcoming of one's own doubts or quibbles, of someone else's questions, or perhaps of the world's own mysteries. We then may ask: In
what does Meno's receptivity consist? How does he manage to join
together with Socrates to gain and share an education?
Meno opens the dialogue by asking how virtue is learned or acquired. Socrates suggests that Meno begins with the wrong question.
In his opening exchange with Meno,36 Socrates claims that in order to
know the attributes of anything (quaJe), one first must know what the
thing is, its nature or essence (quid).37 So the primary question becomes not how virtue is learned or acquired (as Meno wishes to inquire), but rather what virtue is. Socrates' first advice is this: Ask first
things first.
Now, it seems possible to question the wisdom and the necessity of
proceeding as Socrates advises, in part because it is not clear how we
can determine the essence of an object or of a phenomenon without
also, simultaneously as it were, determining or knowing its attributes
or qualities. So Meno's inquiry into one of the attributes of virtue
(how we learn or acquire it) might well make sense to pursue; at least,
I do not think that, in the abstract, we can rule it out ab initio. But we
are not working in the abstract here; instead, we are working in the
concrete context of this specific dialogue. And, in order to make this
initial question of Meno's a sensible project of inquiry here and now,

36. See Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 23-24 (70a-71 b).
37. ld. at 24 (71b). Eventually, Socrates drops this demand because Meno simply refuses
to heed it. But Socrates still manages to make the point that, by his lights, this is taking things
backwards:
Socrates: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not have
inquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained "what it is." But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave,
and never of controlling yourself-such being your notion of freedom-I must
yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to inquire into the
qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you
condescend a little and allow the question "Whether virtue is given by instruction,
or in any other way," to be argued upon hypothesis?
ld. at 45 (86d-e). This point about taking the relative topics in the wrong order is reiterated by
Socrates in the very last speech in the dialogue. See id. at 61 (100b).
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its proponent, Meno, would have to make an argument that would
take account of Socrates' distinction between quale and quid and
would have to show Socrates where he is wrong or misguided in his
assumption (that the essence of a thing must be defined before we can
learn about its attributes). But Meno makes no such argument. He
makes no attempt to refute or respond to Socrates' assumption because,
as his responses to Socrates' opening question reveal, Meno does not
understand either Socrates' question about the nature of virtue or the
assumption behind it.
Meno begins, then, in a state of ignorance-ignorance trebled, really, because he is ignorant (1) as to Socrates' method of asking questions, (2) as to the nature of virtue itself, and (3) as to his own ignorance about these matters. Meno's main problem is the third point; he
does not realize that he is ignorant. So Socrates must make Meno's
ignorance apparent to him, must make it live for him. As Meno's consciousness of his ignorance increases, so too does his receptivity to Socrates' questions (not his responsiveness to those questions, but his receptivity to the doubt that they express). He entertains them
more-even if he finds himself less able to answer them.
The synoptic outline proposed at the beginning of Section I of this
Essay emphasizes the side of the Meno that involves the education of
the three different students. 38 Yet a slightly different outline of the dialogue. would characterize the movement of the Meno in terms of the
series of stages, or the different turns and developments, in the Socratic
inquiry that Meno experiences as he is educated into the Socratic
method. These stages or developments are the following:

1. The Ethos of Asking and Answering (pp. 23-31 (70a-7 6e»
2. We Discover Our Own Ignorance-and Disillusionment Ensues
(pp. 31-36 (77a-80d»
3. How Is Inquiry into the Unknown Possible? We Must "Re-Collect" Our Knowledge and Use It As Our Guide (pp. 36-45 (80d86c»
4. A Renewal of the Search, a Renewal of Inquiry (pp. 45-49 (86c8ge»
5. When A Student Does Not Wish to Inquire (pp. 49-55 (90a-95a»
6. Back to the Initial Question: Can Virtue Be Taught? (pp. 55-61
(95a-100b»
The first stage in this second outline of the Meno is the stage where
Socrates tries to teach Meno how to ask and answer questions about

38. See supra p. 225.
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virtue. Even when Meno seems to get the hang of the technique of
asking and answering questions in the spirit of Socrates, he does not
leave the scene, because he still is required by Socrates to give a helpful definition of virtue. This is the second stage in Socratic inquiry.
And at this stage Meno once again fails: he does not manage to give an
acceptable definition of virtue. When Meno proves unable to do
this-although Socrates has already shown him how to give an acceptable definition of figure or shape-Meno sinks into disillusionment.
Then, at the third stage in the dialogue, Socrates turns to Meno's
slave-boy, and Socrates takes him through the same process of disillusionment. But the third stage does not stop here, at disillusionment.
Rather, having shown the slave-boy that he does not know what he
thinks he knows, Socrates proceeds to show him that he does still know
enough to enable him (the slave-boy) to answer some of Socrates' questions about arithmetic and geometric figures. So, Socrates shows the
slave-boy that he (the boy) has the wherewithal necessary for answering the questions put to him by Socrates. And this teaches a lesson to
Meno as well, not only because Meno is an onlooker at this Socratic
demonstration, but, more importantly, because Meno has been revealed (to himself and to others) to be in the same position as the
slave-boy. They both must learn to inquire into the matters puzzling
or confounding them, and their inquiry must come from positions in
which they have had to admit and express their own ignorance:
Meno: ... For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do
not know how to answer yoU. 39
Boy: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know. 40

The full lesson is, however, that each of them can go on to inquire, to
learn, to know, what he needs to know. With resources tested and hope
renewed, Meno and Socrates return to the hunt for an adequate definition of the nature and attributes of virtue.

III.

BEGINNING WITH QUESTIONS, SEEKING DEFINITIVE ANSWERS

Socratic questioning pursues a very deliberate and careful progression, from doubt to doubt and question to question, leading to disillusionment, then leading out of disillusionment into renewal. I now want
to trace more specifically some of the steps in this Socratic progression,
starting at the beginning of the dialogue.

39. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 35-36 (SOb).
40. Id. at 41 (S4a).
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Meno's opening question to Socrates assumes that both of them already know what virtue is (Socrates' "quid"), and now Meno is simply asking Socrates to explain to him one of the attributes of virtue
(Socrates' "quale"): Namely, is virtue gained by teaching or is it instead a natural acquisition? Socrates sees the assumption implicit in
Meno's question and tries to get Meno to see it too. Socrates does not
think that he himself knows what virtue is and, furthermore, does not
think that Meno knows either:
And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as
poor as the rest of the world, and I confess with shame that I know
literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not know the "quid" of
anything, how can I know the "quale"? ... Not only that, my dear
boy, but you may say further that I have never known of anyone else
who did, in my judgment. 41

In the face of this challenge, Meno ignores the assumption implicit
in Socrates' distinction between quale and quid (about which, as I said
above, Meno might have effectively challenged Socrates), and he instead simply proclaims that both Gorgias and he know what virtue is.
Socrates remains skeptical of this claim, but urges Meno to prove him
wrong:
By the gods, Meno, be generous and tell me what you say that virtue
is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken,
and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge [of what
virtue is], although I have been just saying that I have never found
anybody who had. 42

Meno's response to Socrates is arrogance itself: "There will be no
difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the
virtue of a man .... "48 But Socrates rejects Meno's attempted definition of virtue, because it purports to define what virtue is in various
entities, while it fails to state what virtue is in and of itself. "How
fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me
with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping."44
After Socrates' rejection of Meno's attempted definition, it dawns on
Meno that perhaps he does not know what he thinks h~ knows, that
perhaps he does not understand quite as much as he thinks he does,
about the nature of virtue. The specific doubt that Meno expresses,
however, is that he does not yet fully grasp Socrates' question: "I am
beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 23-24 (71 b-c).
at 24 (71 d).
(71 e).
at 25 (72a).
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as I could wish."4Ci This is only the beginning of doubt dawning on
Meno, and all that he announces is his doubt about whether he understands Socrates' question. Meno does not say that, due to Socrates'
questioning, he now doubts whether he understands what virtue is.
That second doubt will come later, but it takes several more passes at
the question, at Socrates' challenge to Meno (to tell him what virtue
is), before Meno comes to realize that he does not know how to answer
Socrates' questions. And it is only after that realization, some pages
farther along, that Meno comes to realize that perhaps he does not
even know what virtue is.
Having humbled Meno, Socrates tries to show him what kind of
questions he is asking and how they might be answered.
Socrates: ... Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that
you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the
answer about virtue.
Meno: I would rather that you answer, Socrates.
Socrates: Shall I indulge you?
Meno: By all means.
Socrates: And then you will tell me about virtue?
Meno: I will.
Socrates: Then I must d~ my best, for there is a prize to be won. 48

Socrates: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old
man to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of
remembering what is Gorgias' definition of virtue.
Meno: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates!7

It is only at this point in the dialogue, a half-dozen pages into it, that
Meno begins to understand that Socrates' questions are different from
the question with which Meno began. He is beginning to gain an appreciation of the precision of Socratic questioning and the elusiveness
of Socratic definitions (which are what Socrates expects as useful answers to his questions).
Since Socrates seems to think that these kinds of questions can have
satisfactory answers and that such answers come in the form of definitions, definitions are what he seeks from Meno, and they are the type
of answer that Socrates himself tries to supply.48 Socrates mayor may

45. [d. (72d).
46. [d. at 29 (75a-b).
47. [d. at 30 (76a-b).
48. Socrates (or perhaps it is Plato) seems to assume that our knowledge of something-here, virtue-is or should always be expressible in the form of a definition. If we truly
know what x is, then we should be able to define x. Consequently, Socrates' characteristic
questions are requests for definitions (of virtue, of courage, of prudence, of piety, of wisdom, of
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not be well-advised to seek definitions in answer to the kind of questions that he entertains. The more important point for us to see, however, is that Socrates' search for definitions is opposed to the kind of
answer that the Sophists offer: a bold and grandiose rhetorical flourish
that tells us nothing, that only pretends to be based in knowledge or
wisdom. Socrates realizes that Meno expected his original question to
have an answer of the kind that Gorgias has taught him to expect.
"[Gorgias] has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand
and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in
which he himself answers all comers."49 But Socrates teaches Meno
that this is a mistaken expectation, because it settles for an answer that
is useless or uninformative. (This is an example of what I meant earlier when I said that a teacher teaches a sense of propriety, one that,
among other things, assesses the value and the utility of the answers
that a person finds acceptable or that he or she settles for. 50 )
The difference between Socrates' way of answering and Gorgias'
way of answering is illustrated when Socrates offers Meno a definition
of "what figure [or shape] is."&l Meno finds Socrates' definition ludicrously simple, lacking profundity or philosophical seriousness. This is
a part of Meno's ignorance, however, as Socrates goes on to show
Meno. When Socrates proposes a different answer to the question,
"What is figure?" (an answer formulated in the style of answer given
by Gorgias), Meno shouts his approval. "That, Socrates, appears to
me to be an admirable answer."52 But Socrates denies the worth of the
answer he has just produced. Such an answer may be comforting to

justice, of knowledge, and so forth).
This is not how 1 proceed in law school, nor is it (I believe) how most of us teach in law
school. My own practice does sometimes rely upon a request for a definition, granted: How are
we to understand "possession," or "reasonable," or "reliance" (and so forth) here? But, more
often, 1 test the knowledge of my students either by asking them to describe a case, a legal rule,
or a statute, or by asking them to explain one. And asking for such descriptions and explanations is not tantamount to a request for a definition. Nonetheless, 1 think that such descriptions
and explanations do (sometimes) adequately express the knowledge that we possess of these
matters, of the law (and its workings).
This does not respond fully to Socrates' assumption that our knowledge of such matters can
be expressed in definitions, of course, but 1 think that it suggests one possible line of response
that might be successfully developed. The entire topic of the nature of Socrates' questions and
what he meant to elicit by asking them is worth further study. Beginnings on this topic have
been made as follows: GERASIMOS X. SANTAS, SOCRATES: PHILOSOPHY IN PLATO'S EARLY
DIALOGUES 59-96 (1979); GREGORY VLASTOS, What did Socrates Understand by His "What
is F ?" Question?, in PLATONIC STUDIES 410, 410-17 (2d ed. 1981). As to the topic of how our
knowledge of certain matters can be expressed, see infra notes 59, 61.
49. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 23 (70b-c).
50. See supra pp. 228-29.
51. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 29 (7Sb).
52. Id. at 31 (76d).
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Meno, but that is because it fits his preconception of what such an
answer should look or sound like. T~at is why Meno accepts it, not
because it is true or useful.

Socrates: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and
therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer [that
Socrates offered] about figure.
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And yet, ... I cannot help thinking that the other [answer]
was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion
if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as
you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries. 1I8
The surprise is that Meno does stay, and he is initiated into the intricacies of the Socratic method. It is a method that depends, at one and
the same time, on disillusionment and something else again.

IV.

FIRST COMES DISILLUSIONMENT: MENO AND THE SLAVE-Boy

The first twenty pages of the Meno trace a deepening puzzlement
on the part of Meno, as he is initiated into the intricacies of Socratic
questioning. This puzzlement eventuates in Meno's disillusionment.
But Socrates does not end his teaching there. He goes on, rather, to
duplicate this disillusionment in Meno's slave-boy (thereby showing
Meno that we all-the high, the low, and the middle-share this aspect of the human condition), and then he further shows both Meno
and the slave-boy a way out of their disillusionment, by means of their
own knowledge and know-how (such as they are, such as they stand).
And this last lesson teaches the same moral as the first, namely, that
we all-the high, the low, and the middle-share this aspect of the
human condition. So, both the disillusionment and the know-how
shared by Meno and the slave-boy simultaneously name human threats
and human promises: they negatively threaten us with all of the
problems associated with human limitation and failure, and yet they
also positively promise us the powers associated with human possibility
and capacity. How are we to negotiate this treacherous terrain? Socrates does it by discussing these problems with others, by inquiring into
these matters in the company of another.
When two go together in the course of Socratic inquiry, we find out
what they share. What human beings share, basically, is their ignorance and an ability to overcome it, an ability to learn (not an ability
to learn everything they want to learn, but perhaps to learn whatever

53. Id. at 31 (76e).
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they may need to know). It is the peculiar genius of the early and
middle dialogues of Plato, which I think portray Socrates at his best,
that they teach two interrelated lessons about human ignorance and
limitation:

1. You do not know what you' think you know.
2. You know more (or other) than what you think (you know).114
The first lesson is a lesson in disillusionment, as I understand it, because it typically concerns a matter about which we all seemingly
know, or should know. How is it that we do not in fact know-as
Socrates keeps showing us, and then reminding us-something that we
think we should (or do) know? It is disillusioning to conjure up such a
question. But the other side of Socrates' teaching is that, given an
awareness of our ignorance, we also must acknowledge that we do in
fact know more (or other) than what we think we know. So there is
hope for us yet; and this I take to be Socrates' second lesson, the
"something else" he offers us.
L~t us begin with the first lesson that Socrates teaches: we do not
know what we think we know. I said that this discovery leads to disillusionment. It is disillusioning to learn that something that we think
we know and perhaps even think to be a matter of common knowledge--an epistemological possession that we share in common-is, in
fact, something that we do not know at all. Typically, in the early and
middle dialogues, Socrates orchestrates this insight by claiming not to
know about a given phenomenon, whereas Socrates' interlocutor or
student claims to know all about that same phenomenon. Then, when
Socrates shows his interlocutor that he (the interlocutor) does not know
any more or any better than Socrates, the two of them are reduced to
the same position or status, namely, that of not knowing. They have
achieved Socratic ignorance. So the operative Socratic insight is that we
all start from ignorance.
But the Socratic position for the initiation of inquiry is not only one
of not knowing, but also one of wanting to know, wanting to learn.
With the aid of Socrates' preparation by means of intense questioning,
we are confused or. perplexed about something in the world, in others,
or in ourselves, or for some other reason we are interested in something, and this propels us into taking an interest in the matter at hand,
prompting us to inquire into it. So, for example, when Meno begins by
asking Socrates a question about an attribute of virtue, he suggests

54. These two lessons of Socratic teaching are the twin themes of my companion essay. For
a further development of these twin themes and a more explicit connection of them to law school
teaching today, see Eisele, supra note 2, at 603-19.
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(and he thinks) that he knows what virtue is. And when Socrates ends
his response by saying that neither he nor anyone else that he has ever
met knows what virtue is, this astonishes Meno. But when Meno's
efforts to disprove Socrates are all rejected, with what appear to
Meno's satisfaction to be good reasons for rejection, this shakes Meno's
confidence. It is meant to do so, of course, because Socrates is trying to
show Meno that his confidence in his own knowledge-in his claim to
know what virtue is-is misplaced. Socrates accomplishes this revelation by revealing Meno's own confusion or perplexity: Socrates shows
Meno the confusion that exists in Meno's own mind and in his many
attempted definitions of virtue. By asking Meno apparently simple and
straightforward questions that he is unable to answer, questions that
Meno himself feels to be fair, ones that he feels he should be able to
answer if he truly does know what virtue is, Socrates reveals to Meno
his own confusion and perplexity. Meno thought that he knew what
virtue was, but it turns out that he did not.
The maxim found at the Delphic oracle, "Know thyself,"66 is more
complicated to apply and more difficult to honor in practice than we
might believe. As to Meno, this Delphic injunction prescribes a threepart project, because Meno begins with his ignorance "trebled":66 (1)
He is ignorant as to the nature of Socratic questions and how they
need to be answered (or the kind of answer that they expect or require); (2) he also is ignorant as to the nature or essence of virtue-at
least he is unable to produce a definition of virtue that Socrates and he

55. It is reported that this saying was inscribed over the threshold of the temple at Delphi:
[AJt Delphi the educational power of Greek religion reached its maximum, and
spread from there far beyond the frontiers of Hellas. The wise sayings of sages
were dedicated to Apollo and inscribed in his temple, since their worldly wisdom
was only a reflection of his divine wisdom. And at his door his worshippers saw
the command Know thyself-the doctrine of sophrosyne, by which men learn to
remember the limits of human power and ambition, expressed in the legislative
form that was characteristic of the age.
1 WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE 167 (Gilbert Highet trans., 2d
ed. 1945) (footnote omitted).
In The Apology, Socrates justifies his teaching method in part by saying that he was told
that the Delphic orade said that no one was wiser than Socrates. See PLATO, supra note 22, at
25 (21a). Yet Socrates knew that he did not know. Putting these together-he knew himself
well enough to know that he was ignorant, and the oracle said that no one was wiser than
he---'this seems to mean (and meant to Socrates) that all of his interlocutors failed to know what
they thought they knew. So Socrates takes as one of his purposes in life the effort to show others
that they do not know what they think they know.
The Delphic saying, "Know thyself," also comes under Socratic scrutiny in the Charmides
and the Protagoras. See PLATO, Charmides, in LACHES AND CHARMIDES 51, 76, 80 (165a,
167a) (Rosamond Kent Sprague trans., Library of Liberal Arts 1973); PLATO, PROTAGORAS 46
(343b) (Benjamin Jowett & Martin Ostwald trans., Library of Liberal Arts 1956).
56. See supra p. 237.
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can accept as satisfactory or adequate; and (3) he does not know initially that he is ignorant in either of these respects.
Socrates' insistence on the idea that any object or phenomenon has a
defining nature or essence, and that we must be able to state a definition of that nature or essence if we claim to know what it is (or, more
positively, if we ever are truly to know what the nature or essence of
the object or phenomenon is), is the anvil on which Meno's arrogance
is crushed:

Socrates: ... Why, did I not ask you to tell me the nature of virtue
as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this, but declare
every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue, as
though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this, too, when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the
same question: What is virtue?1I7
It is Meno's continued claim to know the nature of virtue, and yet his
continued inability to articulate a definition that satisfies either Socrates or himself, one that holds up under their combined critical inspection, that reduces Meno to disillusionment. He fails to support his
claim to know, because he does not know what he thinks he knows.
His recognition of this fact leads to frustration and disillusionment,
expressed this way:

Socrates: Then begin again, and answer me. What, according to you
and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?
Men 0: 0 Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you
were always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now
you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wit's end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo
fish, who torpifies [stuns, numbs] those who come near him and
touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and
my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you;
and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches
[by the Sophists] about virtue before now, and to many persons-and
very good ones they were, as I thought-at this moment I cannot
even say what virtue is. liS
Not every failure of knowledge leads to disillusionment. But once
Meno thinks that he has understood Socrates' question, and then
gamely tries to comply with the demand for a definition, Meno seems

57. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 35 (79d-e).
58. Id. at 35-36 (7ge-80b).
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to be in the best possible position to succeed. He knows what is now
being asked of him, he knows the phenomenon in question, and still he
finds himself unable to say what virtue is! Well, that refutation produces more than mere discouragement. It makes a person feel that he
or she just does not know what he or she claims to know. (It may even
make a person skeptical of anyone's claim to know anything at all; this
is how skepticism gets started:19 ) For someone in the position of Meno,
who has claimed to know what virtue is and has claimed to understand
what Socrates is asking, the result of this entire process is
disillusionment.
Meno's word for disillusionment is "torpification,"60 which is unusual, but I think that one can see the kind of experience that he is
trying to capture. He feels as though Socrates has cast a spell over
him; he feels bewitched and enchanted; he is at his wit's end. In a
sense, he still knows that he knows what virtue is (or he still thinks
that he knows what virtue is), and yet he always seems to find himself
unable to say what it is, to express the knowledge that he has (or
thinks he has).61 This makes him too numb to think or speak. And

59. Why, in such circumstances, do we not think instead that perhaps virtue cannot be
known or described as we seem to think or to assume that it can? In this sense, virtue may not
be defined as we seem to think of its being defined; yet perhaps in another sense it can be
known or described. (I have said more about the possibility of Socratic definition, and of other
types of definition, in Eisele, Virtue, supra note *, at 498-501.)
We do not take this alternative route because, I suppose, it seems so obvious to us that we
do know what virtue is, and equally obvious what this knowledge consists in and how to go
about defining or expressing it. Wittgenstein, for one, is at pains to get us to consider the road
not taken. His entire programme of explicating our shared knowledge by means of the criteria
we possess and the grammatical structure or schema that those criteria trace, is aimed at making
available to us-making us conscious of-the knowledge that we actually possess and how (the
sense in which) we actually possess it. Places to begin reading in this alternative vision of our
knowledge include the following: CAVELL, supra note 23; LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 78,90,147-51,371-74 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968).
For further remarks on disillusionment and skepticism, see Eisele, supra note 2, at 602, 613.
60. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that "torpification" is Jowett's word for translating
Meno's experience. The other three translators of the Meno whose translations I have consulted
instead speak of Meno's "perplexity" and the fact that Socrates' questioning makes him
"numb." (These translators do also speak, however, in terms of Meno's being "bewitched" and
"beguiled," in terms of "magic" and "witchcraft," and in terms of "enchantment.") See Allen,
supra note 3, at 162; Grube, supra note 3, at 12-13; Brown & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 30-31.
61. Perhaps the classic formulation of this perplexity-thinking that one knows, but also,
at the same time; doubting that one knows or fearing that one does not know-is St. Augustine's. In his Confessions, he voices the dilemma this way:
What is time? Who can easily and briefly explain this? Who can comprehend this
even in thought, so as to express it in a word? Yet what do we discuss more
familiarly and knowingly in conversation than time? Surely we understand it
when we talk about it, and also understand it when we hear others talk about it.
What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to
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then the disillusionment comes. He not only does not know what to say
("For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know
how to answer you"); he no longer knows whether he even knows
what virtue is ("at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is"). He
is full of doubt.
This makes two of them. In announcing that he now doubts whether
he knows what virtue is, Meno has only arrived at the same position of
ignorance already reached and acknowledged by Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue. "And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region
of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the world, and I confess with
shame that I know literally nothing about virtue."82 The shame in
Socrates' confession of his ignorance is an expression of the sheer fact
that he knows nothing about virtue. He has no excuse for his igno-.
rance, because he has had the time and the ability to find out what he
needs to know about virtue. But beyond this expression, there is no
shame in Socrates' admission; it is this very recognition of one's own
ignorance (an admission or recognition that paradoxically announces
an increase in one's self-knowledge) that makes possible whatever
knowledge, or progress toward knowledge, any subsequent inquiry
may achieve.
Socrates insists on this need to recognize one's own ignorance as the
pre-condition to joining Meno in an inquiry into the nature of virtue.
And, since Meno now shares Socrates' perplexity and his admitted ignorance on the topic of virtue, perhaps they are prepared to inquire
further, together:
Socrates: . . . As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as
well as the cause of torpidity [numbness, perplexity] in others, then
indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex others, not
because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. And
now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case,
although you did once perhaps know, before you touched me. How-

someone who does ask me, I do not know . . . .
ST. AUGUSTINE. THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 287 Oohn K. Ryan trans., Image
Books 1960) (Book XI, ch. 14, ~ a-b).
So long as you do not ask me to articulate my knowledge, I know it. But as soon as you put
me on the spot, I lose my knowledge of it. How can our knowledge be so fleeting, so fragile, so
unavailable when we most need it? So it is that disillusionment with human knowledge seems to
alternate with a pugnacious willfulness that one still knows what he or she claims to know
(thereby expressing our unwillingness to acknowledge our limits, or our ignorance). Wittgenstein and Cavell both comment helpfully on St. Augustine's expression of this phenomenon. See
STANLEY CAVELL, Ending the Waiting Game, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 115, 126
(1969); WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 59, at § 89; see also
supra note 48.
62. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 23 (71b).
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ever, I have no objection to join with you in the inquiry.s3

Socrates recognizes that he shares the ignorance common to all human
beings (hence, his avowal that "I am utterly perplexed myself' and
that "you [Meno] seem to be in the same case"): their condition is a
shared one. To call this condition "ignorance" is slightly misleading,
because ·it is as much a kind of knowledge as it is a lack of knowledge.
Because of the truthfulness and candor of Socrates' questioning and his
willingness to admit his own ignorance, he reveals to himself and to
others a perplexity that already existed, a confusion that existed but
that heretofore had gone unknown or unacknowledged. This realization is a kind of knowledge, not ignorance. Meno, for example, is now
conscious of his ignorance and seems to be able to admit it in front of
others. Whereas before he thought that he knew what virtue was, but
apparently did not know, now he at least knows that he does not know
(what virtue is). So, by learning the limits of his knowledge, he has
gained something valuable. He has gained knowledge (about himself)
by learning where his knowledge ends. And it is exactly such knowledge of one's ignorance that Socrates finds energizing, or empowering.
Meno's slave-boy gains knowledge of his own ignorance by means of
the same treatment from Socrates that Meno received: questioning
leading to perplexity; confusion leading to the slave-boy's tenuous
claim to know something; refutation of the boy's claim leading to his
disillusionment. In the following, Socrates summarizes the boy's educational initiation into disillusionment and what it has gained him:
Socrates: Do you see, Meno, what advances he [the slave-boy] has
made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he
does not know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet; but then
he thought that he knew, and answered confidently as if he knew,
and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor
fancies that he knows.
MenD: True.
Socrates: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?
Meno: I think that he is.
Socrates: If we have made him doubt, and given him the "torpedo's
shock," have we done him any harm?
MenD: I think not.
Socrates: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some
degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy
his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world
again and again that the double space should have a double side.
MenD: True.

63. Id. at 36 (SOc-d).
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Socrates: But do you suppose that he would ever have inquired into
or learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he
did not know, and desired to know?
MenD: I think not, Socrates.
Socrates: Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch?
MenD: I think SO.64

Socrates' claim is that the slave-boy would never have been moved to
inquire into these matters of geometry and mathematical knowledge,
had it not been for "Socrates. He led the boy to confront and to acknowledge his own ignorance in such matters. It is this confrontation
that generates the desire to know or the "wanting to know" that earlier I said is an essential element in making this inquiry possible, and
effective. 611 So, it seems that Meno and his slave-boy find, just as Socrates does, the knowledge of their own ignorance to be energizing, or
empowering.
V.

RECOLLECTION AS THE RESPONSE TO DISILLUSIONMENT

If the knowledge of one's own ignorance prepares the stage for further Socratic inquiry, prepares one to inquire further into the mysteries with which we are perplexed, this is only half of the story. As I
said above, Socrates offers us dual lessons, only one of which is our
disillusionment with our own ignorance. 66 Disillusionment is hardly
apt to motivate us to inquire further-it implies despair,67 not invigoration, and, if left alone, it leads not to inquiry but to a kind of
Thoreauvian "quiet desperation."68 For, if we prove ignorant of things
that we (used to) think common knowledge, what point is there in

64. ld. at 41-42 (84a-c).
65. See supra pp. 227-30, 236, 243.
66. See supra p. 243.
67. That the meaning of disillusionment contains complicated negative and positive connotations is a topic I discuss more fully in my companion essay. See Eisele, supra note 2, at 612. (I
want to thank Professor Thomas Shaffer for convincing me that this complexity needs to be
handled with more care than I had initially given it.)
68. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walden, in A WEEK ON THE CONCORD AND MERRIMACK RIVERS[;) WALDEN; OR, LIFE IN THE WOODS[;) THE MAINE WOODS[; AND) CAPE COD

329 (ch. I, 11 9) (Robert F. Sayre ed., Library of Am. 1985) (1854).
The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation. What is called resignation is
confirmed desperation. From the desperate city you go into the desperate country,
and have to console yourself with the bravery of minks and muskrats. A stereotyped but unconscious despair is concealed even under what are called the games
and amusements of mankind. There is no play in them, for this comes after work.
But it is a characteristic of wisdom not to do desperate things.
ld.
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undertaking further inquiry? What point is there in trying to improve
ourselves or our knowledge, when it seems so desperately out of our
reach?
This is what Meno would like to know, and he expresses this point
after Socrates has led him to disillusionment. "And how will you inquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put
forth as the subject of inquiry? And if you find what you want, how
will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?"69
Faced with their joint perplexity, what are they t~ do? Meno wants to
give up, because he thinks that it is impossible to learn what they wish
to learn-the nature of virtue. How can we know what we are looking
for-much less recognize it if and when we find it-when we do not
know in the first place what it is (what its nature or essence is)? It is
this challenge from Meno that launches Socrates into his celebrated
discussion with Meno's slave-boy.
.
The therapy for disillusionment, according to Socrates, is recollection, and his discussion with the slave-boy is frequently cited as an
early expression of Plato's doctrine of "recollection." This Platonic
doctrine attempts to explain how the immortal soul can first possess
and then recollect knowledge that it has acquired in its earlier existence and acquaintance with the world (and with the Forms):
Socrates: ... The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been
born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether
in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and
it is no wonder that she [the soul] should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue and about everything; for
as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no
difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say "learning," out of a single
recollection, all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for
all inquiry and all learning is but recollection. 70

I can best make sense out of the claim that "all inquiry and all learning is but recollection" by understanding it, not as it may fit or illustrate one of Plato's metaphysical doctrines, but rather as a trope, a
figure of speech, meant to capture the sense and extent to which our
knowledge of any matter comes from the human activity of reconstructing or recapturing it (recounting it, or re-collecting it) from our own
experience.

69. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 36 (80d). Meno's question, which many have
called a paradox, has received considerable attention in the secondary literature on Socrates and
Plato. For starters, I recommend the following two essays: Bernard Phillips, The Significance of
Meno's Paradox, in PLATO'S MENO: TEXT AND CRITICISM 77 (Alexander Sesonske & Noel
Fleming eds., 1965); Michael Welbourne, Meno's Paradox, 61 PHILOSOPHY 229 (1986).
70. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 37 (81c-d).
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To begin with, it is important to remember that Socrates and his
interlocutors investigate matters of common knowledge, objects or phenomena that are constituents of our ordinary experience and language:
virtue, knowledge, belief, courage, wisdom, piety, power, justice, education, and so on. These are shared by all human beings, and this
sharing is a part of what makes them appropriate subjects for philosophical inquiry (Socratic inquiry). As to matters of common knowledge or experience, Wittgenstein said: "[I]t is ... of the essence of our
investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want
to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what
we seem in some sense not to understand."71 This is not the most
transparent comment ever made on philosophical method, but I understand its denial of wanting to learn anything "new" to be a way of
forcing us to face what we share in our experience and life. We are,
that is, to try to engage with this common experience first, rather than
always to look for something else that supposedly underlies or explains
the initial phenomenon confronting us.
In philosophies that proceed on the basis of ordinary language and
experience (as Wittgenstein's and Socrates' philosophies do), looking
always at what we s~y and feel and think and claim as the primary
data with which philosophy has to work (as, emphatically, Socratic
inquiry does), we are not trying to seek some e,xplanation of these data
that appeals to anything outside of them or underlying them (as
though we normally have access to such external causes or underlying
structures). We seek, instead, to understand the data that themselves
constitute our lives, our world, our minds, our ideas and ideals. These
are what we find ourselves in confusion or perplexity over. Philosophical confusion concerns what we make of our own experience and our
own world (or, more typically, what we fail to make of them), and in
this respect, it makes no sense to attempt to understand our conceptions about (or our confusions over) our ordinary experience and world
by going outside of them (or behind them, or beneath them). Such
alternatives postpone these problems or substitute new problems for
old ones; they do not solve the problems with which we begin (the ones
that initially motivated us and our philosophical inquiry) and from
which we possibly never rid ourselves: These old problems are the ones
about which Stanley Cavell speaks in the motto to this Essay:
.
things that ordinary human beings cannot help thinking about, or
anyway cannot help having occur to them, sometimes in fantasy,
sometimes as a flash across a landscape; such things, for example, as

71.

Wn'TGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS.

supra note 59, at § 89, ~ b.
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whether we can know the world as it is in itself, or whether others
really know the nature of one's own experiences, or whether good
and bad are relative, or whether we might not now be dreaming that
we are awake. 72
So we want to make sense out of the very data of our consciousness or
experience.
We mayor may not already have enough data of this kind;73 sometimes Wittgensteinian or Socratic investigations seek additional data,
sometimes a re-organization or re-assessment of the old data. But the
philosophical problem remains that we do not yet understand the data
that we already have-we experience these things, but we do not yet
understand them. Paradoxically, they are ours, but they are not ours.
We "have" them, but we do not yet "possess" them in a firm or clear
mental grasp. What we seek in a philosophical investigation inspired
in a Socratic or Wittgensteinian mood is a better view of, a better understanding of, the experiential data that we already have.
In this respect, Socrates' call to remembrance, to recollect something
that we already know-in the sense that we are already familiar with
it, although we do not yet know it, because we do not yet appreciate it
or its significance--is a call to make ourselve1 aware of something
about which we are not yet as conscious as we should be. Such a conception of the philosopher's task pictures us as being in need of coming-to-our-senses; this is the essence of Socratic inquiry. So, disillusionment is meant to lead to recollection.
VI.

WORKING WITH WHAT WE HAVE: THE EXAMPLE OF THE
SLAVE-Boy

The slave-boy is chosen from several attendants accompanying
Meno, and his only attributes about which Socrates asks are his nativity and his native language. "He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he
not?"7. These are all the tools, all the capacities, that Socrates requires
of him: he needs only to be a native speaker of this natural language.
In the exchange between Socrates and the slave-boy, there are at issue

72. CAVELL, supra note 1, at 9.
73. This is to say that we have all the data that we need in our own lives and experiences;
nothing more exotic or esoteric need be sought (as Wittgenstein says, see supra note 71. and
accompanying text). But this is not to say that philosophy as a discipline or tradition has always
made use of these data. The fact that traditional philosophy has not, in fact, made use of the
data available to it is one of the insights stated and demonstrated in J.L. Austin's work. See,
e.g., J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 123, 128-37 0.0. Urmson &
G.J. Warnock eds., 1961).
74. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 38 (82b).

HeinOnline -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 252 1994-1995

1994]

POVERTY OF SOCRATIC QUESTIONING

253

certain matters of basic mathematical knowledge, concepts of arithmetic and geometry that seem to be among the common inheritance of all
human beings. But, just as Socrates' method of questioning the slaveboy is similar to that used by Socrates on Meno, the end result is similar too: the boy is refuted in his claim to know. This explicit parallel
in the dialogue-between Meno's fate and the slave-boy's fate at the
hands of Socrates and his questioning-seems to me intended to teach
the lesson that Meno and the slave-boy are basically in the same position, one of unconscious ignorance, of which each is made aware by
means of Socrates' questions.
The exchange between Socrates and the slave-boy begins as follows:
Socrates: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a
square?
Boy: I do.
Socrates: And you know that a square figure has these four lines
equal?
Boy: Certainly.
Socrates: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of
the square are also equal?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: A square may be of any size?
Boy: Certainly.711

This is tepid stuff, and it continues in pretty much the same vein, except that the slave-boy gradually comes to speak a little more, to give
some answers that require a bit more calculation or thinking.
Socrates: And how many are twice two feet? Count and tell me.
Boy: Four, Socrates.
Socrates: And might there not be another square twice as large as
this, and having like this' the lines equal?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates.: And of how many feet will that be?
Boy: Of eight feet.
Socrates: And now try and tell the length of the line which forms the
side of that double square: this is two feet-what will that be?
Boy: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.
Socrates: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he
knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of
eight square feet; does he not ?78

Reading this exchange, I cannot agree with Socrates' account of

750 Ido at 38 (82b-c)0
760 Ido at 39 (82d-e)0
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what is happening here: "I am not teaching the boy anything, but only
asking him questions .... " Socrates is asking the slave-boy what lawyers would call Jeading questions (the questions suggest the answers
that the questioner wishes the answerer to give), and the slave-boy
answers with a few words, essentially expressing his assent to what
Socrates has said. This shows nothing about the soul's recollection of
prior knowledge (and very few readers take it to do SO).77 What it does
show, however, is Socrates teaching the slave-boy about two different
kinds of knowledge that he possesses (without knowing it).
First, Socrates is making explicit to the slave-boy certain implications of arithmetic and geometrical figures, implications that follow
from the mathematical knowledge that the boy has (as stated or expressed in the propositions that Socrates puts to him).78 For example,

77. In his collection of essays on the Meno, Malcolm Brown says that there is "nearly
universal doubt about ... [whether) Socrates' interrogation [is) fair, or ... [instead, whether) it
resort[s) to questions 'blatantly leading'." Brown & Guthrie, supra note 3, at xv. Brown goes on
to ask: "[E)ven if it was fair, does the lesson support the momentous consequences (about the
soul's ante-natal condition, about recollection) that Plato seems to be attaching to it?" Id.
On the other side, Professor Allen suggests that the charge of "asking leading questions" is
unfairly made against Socrates:
It is often objected that Socrates' questions to the slave are leading questions,
and thus his example in no way indicates that learning is recollection. But this
objection is confused. A leading question is one which suggests its own answer,
and so defined, many of Socrates' questions are clearly leading. But it is relevant
to observe that, in matters mathematical, the mind of the boy is capable of being
led. In the law of evidence, which deals with empirical fact, leading questions are
open to objection on the ground that they may cause a witness to acquiesce in a
false suggestion. But this is clearly irrelevant when questions deal with a complex
geometrical proof. No false suggestions have been planted; the evidentiary problem
does not arise.
Allen, supra note 3, at 143. Professor Allen may be right in so far as his answer goes, but does
it go far enough? The problem with using leading questions in this context is not that Socrates
might mislead the slave-boy into acquiescing in a false suggestion that the slave-boy might not
otherwise accept. That is, 'we are not trying to protect the slave-boy here from having this
threatened "acquiescence" held against him, as might occur in a court of law regarding an
"admission against interest" that a party in the slave-boy's position might make. Rather, we are
trying to determine whether the answers that the slave-boy gives in response to Socrates' questions are produced by the boy because he, in fact, possesses some inherent knowledge of these
matters, or instead are produced because he is merely facile enough to read and reproduce the
answers suggested to him by Socrates' "leading" questions. As to this latter concern, I do not see
that Professor Allen's response is satisfactory.
How we are to understand Socrates' interrogation of the slave-boy remains problematic, as
does its relation to the more general theme of learning and recollection. Interested readers might
wish to consult the following: Malcolm Brown, Plato Disapproves of the Slave-Boy's Answer, in
Brown & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 198, 198-242; Julius Moravcsik, Learning as Recollection,
in 1 PLATO: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 53, 53-69 (Gregory Vlastos ed., 1971);
Gregory Vlastos, Anamnesis in the Meno, 4 DIALOGUE 143 (1965).
78. Again, Professor Allen has a helpful comment:
[I)f learning and inquiry are recollection, then to inquire is to bring to explicit
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when the boy says, in response to one of Socrates' formulations, "That
is evident,"79 I find myself wanting to add: Now it is evident to you

awareness what is already implicitly known. If this is true, the primary function
of education and teaching is not to impart information, but to rid the soul of false
beliefs which cloud vision and cause blindness; if the doctrine of Recollection is
true, education in some primary sense is a process of refutation, and inherently
Socratic.
Allen, supra note 3, at 142. Allen's suggestion is that learning and inquiry, from Socrates'
perspective, are inextricably connected to both the negative use of elenchus and the positive use
of recollection. I agree and said so earlier. See supra note 31. But this claim still stands in need
of some additional comment.
The Socratic method of inquiry consists of many activities: asking for definitions, hypothesizing cases, investigating examples, using arguments, imagining possible actions or events, telling stories, stating or inventing myths, and so on. But central to Socrates' way of inquiring into
things are two strands: elenchus (the activity of trying to get someone to refute or to convict
himself or herself by way of his or her own words), and recollection (the activity of trying to get
someone to realize or to recognize something by bringing it to consciousness, by registering it
consciously). Elenchus has a negative aim in that it aims at teaching us that we do not know
what we think we know. But, as I suggested before, see supra note 31, this lesson itself has a
positive aspect, because learning that we do not know what we think we know is itself a positive
lesson; it is a case of positive knowledge, because it reveals to us one of the limits of our knowledge. To know that we do not know is to know something positive about ourselves; it is a net
gain in self-knowledge. Similarly, recollection has a positive aim in that it aims at teaching us
that we know more (or other) than what we think we know. But, again, there is a negative side
to this knowledge, because what we eventually recollect may conflict with what we thought we
knew. And, to the extent that we fail to recollect what is sought after, we learn that we do not
know (or share) these things in common, or we learn that something is still blocking our access
to this purported knowledge. So the dual aspects of Socratic inquiry-negative and positive,
elenchus and recollection-run deep, and their relationship is complex.
This dual aspect of Socratic inquiry is expressed below by my undergraduate philosophy
teacher, Jon Moline:
It is important to distinguish between Socratic elenchus and recollection.
Elenchus is a method of testing and refuting false opinions. Recollection is a process by which answerers are held to be able to supply true opinions on matters on
which they have not been instructed. Recollection explains how the Socratic
method or any other method is able to bring people into a condition of episteme. It
is not itself a method, but rather a very tentative notion of the ontological and
psychological basis on which philosophical methods can work.
A close examination of the arguments in the Meno will confirm that elenchus
is finished at 84a, before recollection begins. Elenchus removes the false opinion
that one already has episteme and thus has no need to inquire (to embark on the
process of recollection that Plato identifies with inquiry). Elenchus culminates in
aporia (perplexity) and in the realization that one does not understand what one
thought one did. Inquiry with the slave boy begins at 84d. At 84c, Socrates points
out to Meno that as a result of the perplexity the boy now feels, he "will discover
something by inquiring with me." Only at 85c does the boy "recover true opinion
out of himself," that is, recollect. Clearly elenchus by itself was no more sufficient
for attaining episteme in Plato's view in the Meno than it was later in the Sophist.
Jon Moline, Recollection, Dialectic, and Ontology, in PLATONIC WRITINGS, PLATONIC READINGS 233, 234-35 (Charles L. Griswold, Jr. ed., 1988) (footnote omitted).
79. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 41 (83e).
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(and to all of us), but only because Socrates has shown you (and us)
how it can be derived from the preceding propositions that he has
stated. For our educational benefit, Socrates is eliciting something implicit in the mathematical knowledge that you have; but it is the
teacher's act of eliciting these implications that makes them evident to
you (and to us). Before, as the boy's mathematical knowledge stood, it
was not evident to him what his knowledge implied.
Socrates also is formulating these implications into additional mathematical propositions, to which he then asks the slave-boy's assent. The
boy gives it. But this does not show that the slave-boy was himself
capable of formulating those same propositions (even though they derived from knowledge that he had). He may have possessed this knowledge in the sense that he could recognize the truth of these propositions
or implications once they were stated or formulated for him by Socrates, but this does not mean that the slave-boy's knowledge was enough,
in itself, to enable him to state or to formulate these propositions or
implications for himself or on his own. It was not; he could not do it.
Whatever mathematical knowledge he possessed, it was dormant until
awoken by Socrates' questioning and stimulated into use by Socrates'
prompting.
Second, Socrates shows the slave-boy how to go on with certain
mathematical series concerning arithmetic and geometrical figures
(what happens when one doubles the sides of a square, how to determine the area of a square, and so forth). Socrates is doing this, for
example, when he asks the boy, "Try and see if you can tell me how
much it [the length of a side of a square] will be."Bo In this respect,
Socrates is showing the slave-boy how to use the basic mathematical
knowledge that he possesses to generate new geometrical constructs. It
is not, however, that the boy's basic mathematical knowledge is alive to
him or something upon which he can immediately call. Rather, it takes
an awakening of the boy's knowledge by means of Socrates' questioning in order for the boy to get into the swing of things, to get the hang
of things. Gradually, eventually, the boy is able to generate some of his
own answers to Socrates' questions. Of course, they are nothing more
than basic answers to basic questions. Yet the boy is provoked by Socrates' reminders and exercises into re-invigorating his dormant knowledge of mathematical functions, computations, and operations, into renewing his mathematical know-how to the point where he can put it to
use.
So I do not agree with 'Socrates' remark, "I am not teaching the boy

80. [d. at 40 (83e).
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anything, but only asking him questions"81-as though "only" asking
questions could not possibly amount to teaching! Socrates is doing the
work here: he is eliciting and stating the implied propositions for the
slave-boy's assent; he is formulating the rules for the slave-boy's application; he is showing the slave-boy how to go on constructing different,
yet related, geometrical figures and what their mathematical relations
are as a consequence of those constructions. To elicit, to state, to formulate, to express: these activities are a part of teaching. So, eliciting
the implications of the boy's mathematical knowledge, generating propositions to which the boy assents, and re-awakening the boy's powers
of mathematical know-how (however modest they prove to be), all of
these activities amount to teaching the boy something. 82
Taking what students have and showing them what, in fact, it is
that they possess, as well as testing what they can do with it and experimenting with the possibilities and permutations of the material at
hand, teaches those students a form of self-knowledge (since it is about
themselves and their resources). But such lessons also teach these students a form of knowledge about the world and their profession or
their medium (since it also is about the world's possibilities, or those of
their chosen profession or medium). And these lessons teach a third
thing too. In addition to the reminders and examples that the teacher is
giving to his or her students, the repeated invitations to remember
what they know and to watch what happens when we do this, the
teacher also is trying to get the students to collect their wits about
themselves and to use these materials for themselves. This is the part
of the Socratic lesson that intends to re-invigorate the students, to renew them through disillusioning them.
Socrates makes the slave-boy's mathematical knowledge explicit and
articulate. But he also expands and extends it, because by tying these
new insights and expressions to the old mathematical knowledge and
propositions that the boy possesses, Socrates is integrating them and reconstituting the slave-boy's (modest) body of mathematical knowledge.

81. Id. at 39 (82e).
82. This is not so different from what we do in law school or from what many philosophers do in proceeding Socratically in their classrooms. One main activity of such teaching is to
elicit statements, answers, questions, and concerns from one's students, and then to examine
these for their meaning, which includes their implications, their assumptions, and their consequences. By so doing, we try to teach our students some of the implications of the things that
they say (or are initially willing to say and believe) about cases, statutes, or regulations that they
have been assigned to read and study. We also try to show our students how to go on with some
of the knowledge that they already have (the techniques of reading and of criticizing, for example, that they bring to the cases, statutes, or other legal texts). If these activities of questioning,
parsing, and eliciting the implications (et cetera) truly qualify as "not teaching [our students]
anything," then perhaps we do not teach anything in law school. (I deny it.)
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In this respect, the boy is learning that knowledge is of a piece, that it
is systematic, and that one can build or extend the system by eliciting
its implications and by generating new propositions, formulae, or constructs. 83 Sometimes the system will absorb or incorporate these additions, and sometimes these additions will modify or even revolutionize
the system. The relation is symbiotic or internal between the parts and
the whole.
All of this activity or process of recollection is the second lesson that
Socrates teaches, as stated earlier,84 the matching twin to his first lesson in disillusionment. This second lesson teaches that we know more
(or other) than what we think we know. It is a reminder of our prodigious resources, a call to remember the things that we have learned
and the ways that we have learned them, a call to make ourselves conscious of the techniques and skills and tools that we have at our control
for making sense of the world and coming to terms with it. Our knowledge and our know-how constitute a system that generates knowledge
(not merely collects it)-if we realize how to inquire into its connections, relations, and implications81l and thereby inquire further into the
world of our common experience (which is a system, as Kant showed
us). To the extent that we inhabit this system of knowledge, of language, of culture, of a world, we "know" it already and possess it
already. But to the extent that we remain unaware of or unconscious
to any aspects of the system, leave them unmastered or unexplored,
then we must re-collect these aspects if we are truly to know and to
possess them, to understand them and to be able to put them to use.

83. Once again, Professor Allen is helpful:
[W)hat is meant by Socrates' claim that all nature is suggenes-"akin," or interconnected- ... [is) that by learning one single thing, we can recover all the rest
(81d). The theory of Recollection is not only a theory of inquiry but also one of
inference. A single bit of genuine knowledge can serve as the terminal link in a
golden chain by which we can, Zeus-like, draw to ourselves the whole of intelligible reality.
Allen, supra note 3, at 143-44.
84. See supra p. 243. Peter Winch 'summarizes this Socratic lesson in a way congenial to
my reading of the Meno when he says the following:
[W)hen, in Plato's dialogue Meno, Socrates introduced the slave boy to Pythagoras' Theorem not by telling him the answer to the problem but by eliciting the
answer from him, that is not just a rhetorical device either. The suggestion ... is
that each of us has within him or herself the resources for answering the question:
a point which Plato expre~sed picturesquely in terms of 'recollection.' The further
suggestion is that ... no one truly has the answer who has not arrived at it for
him or herself.
PETER WINCH, Who is my Neighbour?, in TRYING TO MAKE SENSE 154, 156-57 (1987).
85. This is what Wittgenstein means to be studying in his philosophical investigations of
what he calls our "criteria" and our "grammar" or "grammatical knowledge." See supra note
59.
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We recollect them by questioning them and by inquiring into them.
This is what Socrates teaches the slave-boy, and it is such knowledge
that he promises all of us. It is the antidote to his other lesson, that of
disillusionment. .
Socrates' understanding of philosophical inquiry is that it is a matter
of traveling from the known to the unknown; you travel from what you
know to what you do not know. And if you travel well, doing what
you need to do with what you have, then you will end by having domesticated the unknown (in so far as you can do so). But how do you
get from one to the other? Socr~tes' answer is that you begin with
what you have, what you possess, what you can do--your knowledge,
skills, capacities, and aptitudes-and then you pursue your questions
and your doubts, wherever they may lead you, applying to them the
techniques of knowledge-acquisition that you have. Different people
may well differ in the techniques, skills, or capacities that they have;
this matters less, however, than the fact that each person traveling the
road of knowledge must exert himself or herself to the maximum. The
attempt to learn must be made vigorously and strenuously, that is, conscientiously. As Socrates puts it in his prefatory remark to the exchange with the slave-boy, "there is no difficulty in ... learning, out
of a single recollection, all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not
faint." 86 The work required is that of tracing and tying down the numerous strands that, bound together, constitute the system of our
knowledge (such as it is).
This last point, about gaining knowledge by tying things down to
our systematic understandings and resources as they stand, comes out
best in the dialogue toward its end, after Socrates has finished his discussions with the slave-boy and with the interloper Anytus and is back
asking questions of Meno and joining him in mutual pursuit of the
answers. After a long discussion investigating whether or not virtue is
knowledge, Socrates seems to suggest that even if virtue is not knowledge, and even if knowledge of virtue is not possible, or at least is not
possessed by a person, that person can still act virtuously.87 When
asked how this is possible, Socrates says that true opinions, even if they
do not amount to knowledge, can and often do guide our actions, and
when they do, they lead to our acting virtuously. "Then true opinion is
as good a guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was the point
which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when
we said that knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there

86. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 37 (81d).
87. See id. at 46 (87d).
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is also right opinion. "88
The fact that true opinions are insecure or unsteady does not mean
that they are any the less true; rather, it only means that they are less
stable than our knowledge, than things about which we, in fact, know.
(Less stable perhaps because, while we may believe them to be true,
we do not know them to be true, so they seem more transitory, or our
possession of them is more fleeting.) Socrates then searches for an explanation of this difference between the unsteadiness of true opinions
and the steadiness of knowledge, and he finds it in the fact that, according to him, our true opinions, even though true, are not "tied
down," whereas knowledge is tied down to the reason(s) we have for it
(and being tied down to reason is what makes knowledge so much
more valuable than opinion, so much more useful as a guide to our
actions).

Socrates: I mean to say that they [certain works of art) are not very
valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like
runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they
are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the
nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful
and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not
remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are
fastened by the tie of the cause [i.e., until they are tied down by
giving an account of the reason(s) for them); and this fastening of
them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it.
But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of
knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is
why knowledge is more honorable and excellent than true opinion,
because fastened by a chain [of reasoning).89
Socrates says that "this fastening of them [our opinions], friend
Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it."90 If this is
true, then I understand Socrates' emphasis on recollection as the response to disillusionment in this way: When we are led to acknowledge
our ignorance by means of the negative side of Socratic method (his
"e1enchus"), we are asked not to quit in despair, but rather to renew
ourselves in the home of knowledge that we possess. Our common
knowledge, our common experience, our ordinary language-these are
the things that we all share and possess, and they are our ways of
learning what we need to know. They are the structures that we inhabit and the abodes in which we take refuge in this world. Each in-

88. [d. at 58 (97b-c).
89. [d. at 58-59 (97e-98a).
90. [d. at 58 (98a).
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quiry is a journey into the unknown from these inhabitations, but that
is exactly why inquiry is necessary, and productive: because the world
remains to be domesticated, to be brought under the rule of reason (in
so far as it can be). Our method of inquiry is our way of tying down
the unknown, of connecting the unknown with what we already know.
We are asked by Socrates to remember what we already know, to test
it critically, to reduce it to what we can rely upon or are sure of, and
then to use it as our means of gaining new knowledge, more knowledge. The positive side of Socratic inquiry (his "recollection") is the
way that we learn how to tie our opinions down, to anchor them in
whatever knowledge we have inherited or accumulated (from our parents, from others, from our language and our culture, from our own
experience). It teaches us to question things, and then to seek answers
to the questions that we have asked.

VII.

"You

AND

I

ARE NOT GOOD FOR MUCH": POVERTY AND
PERSEVERANCE

Socrates: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much,
and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has
been of me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to
find someone who will help in some way or other to improve US. 91

The first twenty pages of the Meno take us from questioning to
perplexity, from disillusionment to recollection. Up to this point in the
dialogue, Socrates has been trying to teach his method of inquiry to
Meno, first by practicing his art of disillusionment on Meno himself,
and then by duplicating that feat with Meno's slave-boy. But, since the
initial disillusionment leaves Meno wondering what the point or purpose is to any inquiry into the unknown (Meno's challenge: "[H]ow
will you inquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know?"92), Socrates is forced to respond to Meno's question about the point of persevering in their inquiry. If we can say that Socrates responds by evoking similar disillusionment in the slave-boy, and then bringing him out
of it by showing him (and Meno) that each person still knows much
(because their knowledge is based upon learning by "recollection"),
then Socrates has shown that this inquiry into the unknown is worthwhile. So the point becomes one of getting back to the inquiry, and
getting back to the inquiry at hand is what the second half of the dialogue does.

91. [d. at 57 (96d-e).

92. [d. at 36 (SOd).
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But the second half of the Meno is strangely anticlimactic. It reprises many of the questions raised and pursued in the first half (especially Meno's question: Is virtue taught, is it learned by practice, or is
it a natural inheritance?) and it adds some new questions (in particular, from Socrates: Is virtue knowledge? If so, then who teaches it?).
But a reader can still wonder whether very much progress is made
toward reaching an answer to any oJ these questions. It is in this respect, I think, in its evident failure to reach satisfying answers, that a
reader can find the second half of the Meno to be disappointing. Yet,
as disappointing as it may be, the second half of the dialogue seems to
me to have its own important purposes, chief among them, producing
the very disappointment that we feel when the inquiry ends
inconclusively.
What this disappointment forces upon us is a recognition that the
Socratic method of questioning and inquiry, even when used properly,
does not guarantee success. Pursuing his method is appropriate when
we are in doubt, but using his method of inquiry does not promise that
we shall ever achieve the knowledge that we seek. This is the poverty
of Socrates' method of inquiry, the poverty of Socratic questioning. s3
This impoverishment appears at the very beginning of the Men 0,
when Meno first asks his question of Socrates and receives what, to his
way of thinking, is a very strange response.
Meno: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by
teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then
whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?
Socrates: 0 Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding;
but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their
wisdom, especially at Larissa, which is the native city of your friend
Aristippus. And this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the
flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and
the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And
he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and
bold style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene
who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear
Meno. Here at Athens, there, is a dearth of the commodity, and all

93, At his trial, Socrates relies upon his personal or economic poverty as an indicator that
he speaks the truth, See PLATO, supra note 22, at 28, 37 (23c, 3Ib-c). He does what he
does-inquires ,philosophically into things-without regard for personal profit or gain. Here I
am trying to tie this claim of poverty to the sense in which his method can also be said to be
(philosophically) impoverished, and this too is a claim for its truthfulness.
The poverty of method in Socrates is, I think, another point of intimacy between him and
,Wittgenstein. For some thoughts on the "poverty" of Wittgenstein's method, see STANLEY CAVELL, THIS NEW YET UNAPPROACHABLE AMERICA 70-72 (1989).
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wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if
you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face and say: "Stranger, you have far
too good an opinion of me if you think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less
whether it is acquired by teaching or not." And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the
world, and I confess with shame that I know literal)y nothing about
virtue; and when I do not know the "quid" of anything, how can I
know the "quale"? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I
tell if he was fair or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could?
Meno: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that
you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report
of you to Thessaly?
Socrates: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I
have never known of anyone else who did, in my judgment. 94

Socrates wants Meno to understand that, while Socrates cannot offer
him an answer of the kind that he (Meno) has been taught by Gorgias
to expect to such questions, Socrates may be able to offer Meno something else. If it then turns out that Meno takes this "something else"
. offered by Socrates to be a pittance, something that is apt to appear
impoverished when compared to the grandiose answers offered by the
Sophists, that would be Meno's loss. At least, this is the way that I
understand Socrates' long response to Meno's opening question, with
its emphasis on his inability to answer in the way or the style to which
Meno seems to have become accustomed:
[Gorgias] has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand
and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in
which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may
ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at
Athens, there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to
have emigrated from ·us to you.9I!

Given his admission as to a "dearth" of wisdom, however, Socrates
does not simply leave the discussion or give up the question. Rather,
what he goes on to do-and this is the life of the dialogue-is to teach
Meno a different way to ask the questions that are bothering him and,
thus, a way to look for a different kind of answer.
Is this an impoverished view of philosophy, of what philosophy offers us and the wisdom (such as it is) that it makes available to us'? To

94. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 23-24 (70a-71b).
95. [d. at 23 (70b-7ta).
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this question, I think that Socrates would unabashedly answer, "Yes."
While he is dogged in his perseverance, in his seeking of answers to
the questions that we ask ourselves (or, more often, the questions that
he helps us to see that we need to ask ourselves), this does not mean
that Socrates therefore believes that final answers are available. A fundamental aspect of Socrates' practice is getting us to see that such answers are not available or possible; and yet, even so, despite this fact,
or in its very light, what we need to do is to. continue to seek the
answers that we do have available, the answers that are possible. Socrates' questions are questions that we humans seem fated to ask ourselves; and yet, we do not seem to know what kinds of answer they
may have-or even whether these kinds of questions have answers at
all. As Cavell puts it, "Such thoughts are instances of that characteristic human willingness to allow questions for itself which it cannot answer with satisfaction. "96
Answers to such questions do not come once and for all, but rather
serially or sequentially (when they come at all). And what may prove
to be a satisfactory answer on one occasion or in one context may prove
to be less than satisfactory on another occasion or in another context.
And this fact-as to the fragility and specificity of answers, their fitness only for a particular purpose in a given context-may require us
to go farther, or to change directions, when certain perennial questions
arise once again for us. But then, we should know this if we have
studied Socrates' example, because doggedness in the pursuit of acceptable answers to necessary questions is what Socrates teaches. (If some
see this as an impoverished way to proceed, Socrates might grant their
point, but only on his understanding of what constitutes both the
promise and the poverty of his teaching and of what it achieves.)
At the end of the Men 0, Socrates and Meno arrive at the following
inconclusive conclusion:

Socrates: ... To sum up our inquiry-the result seems to be, if we
are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason .... 97
Socrates: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by divine dispensation. But we shall never know the certain
truth until, before asking how virtue is given, we inquire into the
actual nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now
that you are persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do

96. CAVELL, supra note 1, at 9.
97. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 61 (9ge-100a).
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not let him be so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have .
done good service to the Athenian people. 88

It would be a mistake to take Socrates' concluding comments on the
source of virtue ("that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an
instinct given by God to the virtuous"; "that virtue comes to the virtuous by divine dispensation") as though' they were meant to be a f~nal
answer, or meant to explain virtue. Rather, by resorting to this sort of
gesture-virtue just appears on the scene, as though it were a gift from
above-Socrates is saying that he does not have. an explanation of virtue's source. What he offers us in closing is a myth-nothing less,
nothing more-and the promise of further inquiry if we seek more
enlightenment. "But we shall never know the certain truth until,
before asking how virtue is given, we inquire into the actual nature of
virtue."89 Right now, as the matter stands, for all we know, virtue is
(or might be) the gift of God, divine inspiration. This is hardly an
account of its source or origin; it is an apostrophe indicating that some
more work needs to be done before we can render any acceptable or
satisfying account of the source of virtue. As it stands, we do not yet
understand virtue well enough to explain its source. And perhaps we
never shall.
The poverty of Socrates' method is the fact that it does not promise
or ensure conclusive results. It may seek them, but it does not promise
or ensure them. All that it promises is that life is worth questioning,
that it repays questioning, and that it is worth our time to pursue the
questions that we have or discover. Asking questions-some good,
some not so good (good or not good in terms of their aptness or their
timeliness)-and then responding to them appropriately, in a productive yet humble way, is at the heart of this dialogue and at the heart of
Socrates' teaching. And by the end of the dialogue, I think, Socrates
has shown us that his way of questioning is his faith, his hope for the
future. This is what he puts his trust in; this is what he invests himself
m.
I said at the beginning of this Section that the second half of the
dialogue is strangely anticlimactic, and yet it seems to have its important purposes. I have tried to detail one of these purposes in the past
few pages, but there is one additional purpose of the second half of this
dialogue to which I would like to draw attention. We know that, normally, Socrates does not claim to know anything. So it is startling to
find, at the beginning and the end of the second half of the dialogue,

98. [d. (tOOb).
99. [d. (tOOb).
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two unusually forthright and bold statements of Socrates' beliefs. Here
we have Socrates claiming to know, not just one, but two things.
His first credo comes at the end of his examination of the slave-boy,
when Meno and Socrates are discussing what that examination has
shown. The second credo comes at the end of the dialogue, as Meno
and Socrates are completing their entire discussion:

Socrates: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have
said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be
better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to inquire than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that
there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not
know-that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and
deed, to the utmost of my power. IOO
Socrates: I, too, speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet
that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture
with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but
this is most certainly one of them.lol
Socrates is willing to say, to claim to know, this: (1) that it is better for
us to think that we ought to inquire into things that we do not know,
and (2) that knowledge differs from true opinion. These two credos of
Socrates do not promise that knowledge is possible for us, or that we
shall gain knowledge if we inquire into that which we do not know.
They only say that it is better for us to believe that we ought to inquire, and that knowledge does differ from true belief.
The moral of Socrates' two credos is worked out in detail in Socrates' discussion with Anytus, who only appears in the second half of the
dialogue. It is not otherwise clear why Plato needs to introduce another
interlocutor at this point in the dialogue, but if we understand Anytus
to be an exemplar of the negation of Socrates' two credos, then perhaps
we shall see his usefulness. Socrates' first credo says that it is better for
us to believe in the efficacy of inquiry; but, as I said earlier while
discussing Anytus' role as one of the three students, Anytus does not
believe in the efficacy of Socratic inquiry.102 In fact, he barely participates with Socrates' questioning, and he quickly leaves the discussion
when he thinks that Socrates is defaming his fellow Athenians. On
Anytus' model, inquiry is not good for us, but rather dangerous.
Socrates thinks differently. I do not say that he thinks that inquiry is
either easy or pleasant for us, and I doubt that he would deny its dan-

100. Id. at 44-45 (86b-c).
101. Id. at 59 (98b).
102. See supra pp. 226-27, 229, 231.
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gerous consequences (not after his trial). But I do believe that Socrates
would recommend inquiry to us despite its dangers (or perhaps he
would have seen them as an inevitable cost of inquiry). In any event,
Socrates asks that we believe in the efficacy of inquiry. We are to stick
to it, to try again to understand that about which we are ignorant.
This is a counsel to perseverance,' as it also is one of hope ..
Anytus also denies (in practice) Socrates' second credo, the difference between knowledge and true opinion. For example, whereas Anytus may be quite correct in his belief that the Sophists are corrupters of
youth and that the Sophists do not teach virtue to their students (a
belief that was discussed in Section I of this Essayl08), Anytus does not
bother to tie this opinion down to the rest of his knowledge by inquiring into it. This cavalier attitude toward the basis of his purportedly
true opinion (Anytus' claim to know about the Sophists) is what astonishes Socrates: "You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot
make out, judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, you know about them."lo4 Anytus acts as though
true opinion-if his opinion of the Sophists is true-is just as good,
just as solid or reliabl~, as knowledge. And this Socrates denies.
Anytus' willingness to accept true belief as being as good as knowledge contravenes Socrates' second credo, and it is the point on which
the dialogue closes. If we truly wish to tie our opinions down-be they
about virtue or some other topic-then, once again, we shall have to
inquire into them and the matter at hand. We shall have to question
them. For Socrates, and apparently for those of us who try to follow
his example in our teaching, there is no other way.

103. See supra pp. 226-27, 229.
104. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 52 (92c).

HeinOnline -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 267 1994-1995

HeinOnline -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 268 1994-1995

